Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

In this essay I examine the different views that Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty hold on the phenomenological relevance of Gestalt psychology. Against Husserl’s dismissal of the latter on the grounds of its purported “naturalism,” they each claim that the Gestaltist critique of psychological atomism releases a transcendental perspective in the study of perception. However, they find themselves in disagreement as to what phenomenological status should be granted the transcendental nature of the Gestalt. I argue that the central point of contention revolves around the application of the eidetic method of Husserl. Whereas for Gurwitsch in-vestigations pursued in line with Gestalt theory turn out to be noematic analyses, confronting the subject with ideal unities disclosed in eidetic assertions, Merleau-Ponty is critical of this identification, as it seems to him to imply a form of dualism. I conclude by critically con-fronting Gurwitsch’s reading of Gestalt theory with that of Merleau-Ponty, emphasizing the originality of the French philosopher’s characterization of the Gestalt as an originary figure of preobjective being.