Prolegomena to Gurwitsch’s discussion of transcendental reduction: about the constancy hypothesis

Abstract

Aron Gurwitsch proposes, in 1929, a parallel between the refutation of the constancy hypothesis proposed by the Gestalt theory and the transcendental reduction of Edmund Husserl. There is a vast literature on the subject from the point of view of transcendental reduction, but little debate that explores the importance of the constancy hypothesis’ role in the discussion. Our objective is to provide a theoretical and historical foundation regarding the emergence and maintenance of the constancy hypothesis in classical psychology, as well as to describe the development of Gestalt, to finally emphasize the relevance of Gestalt theory when proposing its rejection. From this established horizon, it will be possible to better understand the relevance of the interpretation proposed by Gurwitsch, whose merit is to launch a new look of interest on psychology and phenomenology.