The The disparity of experience and the paradox of embodied subjectivity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62506/phs.v6i2.260Keywords:
Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, figure-ground, body schema, fleshAbstract
In the first chapter of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty raises the question of the specific way in which the living body of the perceiving subject is perceived. This question is posed in continuity with his treatment of the structures of perception in the introductory chapter. Among these structures, the figure-ground distinction is, without a doubt, the most important. According to this distinction, perceived bodies and objects gain unity and stability only against a backdrop of other bodies and surfaces. However, Merleau-Ponty crucially raises the question of how this distinction applies to the perceived unity of the own body, suggesting that the living body should be considered the “third term” of this distinction. He considers the body as a unique Gestalt, not only a whole irreducible to the sum of its parts, but also an existential unity defined by its situational spatiality, called the “body schema.” This schema distinguishes the unity of the body, providing a framework for self-reflection and reversibility in actions such as touching or seeing one’s own body. From this perspective, one could argue that Merleau-Ponty lays the groundwork for understanding the body schema as a conceptual precursor to his later concept of “flesh.” In my article, I will explore this interpretation of the body schema, highlighting how it differs in some important aspects from Husserl’s understanding of the constitution of the living body, namely his theory of so-called “localized sensations” and the Leib-Körper distinction.
References
Alloa, Emmanuel & Natalie Depraz. 2012. Edmund Husserl - ‘Ein Merkwürdig Unvollkommen Konstituiertes Ding.’ In Leiblichkeit: Geschichte Und Aktualität Eines Konzepts. Emmanuel Alloa et al. (eds.). Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck.
Barbaras, Renaud. 1999. Le desir et la distance. Introduction à une phénoménologie de la perception. Paris, Vrin.
Barbaras, Renaud. 2001a. “Merleau-Ponty et la psychologie de la forme.” Les Études philosophiques, no. 2: 151–63.
Barbaras, Renaud. 2001b. De l’être du phénomène. Sur l’ontologie de Merleau Ponty. Grenoble, Jerôme Millon.
Barbaras, Renaud. 2008. Sur les trois sens de la chair. Chiasmi International 10: 19–33.
Bimbenet, Étienne. 2002. De la science à la philosophie: la création continuée du concept de forme dans l’œuvre de Merleau-Ponty. In Les cigognes de la philosophie. Études sur les migrations conceptuelles. Laurent Fedi (ed.). Paris, L’Harmattan
Breeur, Roland, 1998. Merleau-Ponty, un sujet désingularisé. Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 96:2, pp. 232–253.
Behnke, Elizabeth A. 1996. Edmund Husserl’s Contribution to Phenomenology of the Body in Ideas II. In Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II. Thomas Nenon & Lester Embree (eds.). Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Carman, Taylor. 1999. The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical Topics 27, no. 2.
Colonna, Fabrice. 2014. Merleau-Ponty et le renouvellement de la métaphysique. Paris: Hermann.
Dastur, Françoise. 1983. Husserl and the Problem of Dualism. In Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.). Analecta Husserliana 16. Dordrecht, Springer, 65–75.
Derrida, Jacques. 2000. Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy, Paris, Galilée.
Doyon, Maxime. 2021. La Gestalt d’autrui. Note sur l’étendue de l’influence de la Gestaltpsychologie chez Merleau-Ponty. Phänomenologische Forschungen 2021 (2):160-178.
Foultier, Anna Petronella. 2015. Incarnated Meaning and the Notion of Gestalt in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology. Chiasmi International 17:53-75.
Franck, Didier. 1981. Chair et corps. Sur la phénoménologie de Husserl. Minuit, Paris.
Halák, Jan. 2021. Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 59, no 3, pp. 309–341.
Head, Henry & Gordon Holmes. 1911. Sensory Disturbances from Cerebral Lesions. Brain 34, no. 2–3: 102–254.
Head, Henry. 1920. Studies in Neurology, vol. 2. London: Oxford University Press.
Heinämaa. Sara. 2009. Phenomenological Responses to Gestalt Psychology. In Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought. Sara Heinämaa & Martina Reuter (eds.). Berlin, Springer.
Heinämaa. Sara. 2021. On the Transcendental Undercurrents of Phenomenology: The Case of the Living Body. Continental Philosophy Review 54 (2): 237–257.
Husserl, Edmund. 1952. (Hua IV) Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, Edmund. 1973. (Hua XVI) Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907. Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, Edmund. 1973. (Hua XIV) Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921–28. Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945. La phénoménologie de la perception. Paris, Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1960a. Le philosophe et son ombre. In Signes, Paris, Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1960b. Le langage indirect et les voix du silence. In Signes, Paris, Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1960a. Le visible et l’invisible. Paris, Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1960b. L’Œil et l’Esprit. Paris, Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1995. La nature. Notes: cours du Collège de France. Ed. Dominique Séglard. Paris, Seuil.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1996. Notes des cours au Collège de France (1958-1959 et 1960-1961). Édition de Stéphanie Ménasé. Paris, Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2000a. La philosophie et la politique sont solidaires. In Parcours deux: 1951–1961. Ed. Jacques Prunair, pp. 302–304. Paris, Verdier.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2000b. Un inédit de Merleau-Ponty. In Parcours deux: 1951–1961. Ed. Jacques Prunair, pp. 36–48. Paris, Verdier.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2011. Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression: cours au Collège de France, notes, 1953. Geneva, Metis Presses.
Moran, Dermot. 2013. The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Intertwining and Reflexivity. In The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity. Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), 285–303. Dordrecht: Springer.
Moran, Dermot. 2015. Between Vision and Touch. From Husserl to Merleau-Ponty. In Carnal Hermeneutics. Richard Kearney & Brian Treanor (eds.), 214–34. New York, Fordham University Press.
Rodrigo, Pierre. 2003. Ni le corps ni l’esprit. Studia Phaenomenologica 3, no. 3–4: 107–17.
Romano, Claude. 2016. After the Lived-Body. Continental Philosophy Review 49, no. 4: 445–68;
Saint Aubert, Emmanuel de. 2013. Être et chair. Du corps au désir: l’habilitation ontologique de la chair. Paris, Vrin.
Schilder, Paul. 1950. The Image and Appearance of the Human Body: Studies in the Constructive Energies of the Psyche. Routledge.
Slatman, Jenny. 2005. The Sense of Life: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Touching and Being Touched. Chiasmi International 7: 305–25.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2006. Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden. Berlin, Suhrkamp.
Welsh, Talia. 2006. From Gestalt to Structure: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Early Analysis of the Human Sciences. Theory & Psychology, 16(4), 527–551.
Zahavi, Dan. 1994. Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Body. Études Phénoménologiques 19: 63–84.
Zahavi, Dan. 2003. Husserl’s Phenomenology. Stanford, Stanford University Press.
