On Some Fundamental Dissensions between John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas

Abstract

Against the interpretation that similarities between the proposals of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas make both authors representatives of a unified position, the present work seeks to demonstrate that, despite the undeniable existence of common points, there are also fundamental distinctions between their worldviews. Such disagreements are related (i) to the critique of instrumental reason in Habermas and his proposal of recovering a communicative reason, which Rawls’s theory of justice does not presuppose; and (ii) to the analytic and unhistorical justification tool proposed by the latter, which does not find place in the propositions of the former, permeated by historicity. Ultimately, despite the marked convergence between both thinkers, their conceptions are frequently in disharmony, making visible the vestiges of the very distinct intellectual traditions in which they were initiated.