



# THE RELATION BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

La Relación de la Fenomenología y la Psicología como un Motor de la Fenomenología Transcendental de Husserl

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A Relação da Fenomenologia e a Psicologia como um Motor da Fenomenologia Transcendental de Husserl

**Abstract:** My aim is to explore the aporetic core of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology, which will go through three stages, a first one in which phenomenology is a type of psychology; second, in which Husserl perfectly distinguishes phenomenology from psychology; and a third, which we could qualify as a transition from the clarity of separation, from the second stage, to an overlapping. The essay will then have three parts, I will delineate, first, Husserl's exposition of his phenomenology as a descriptive psychology in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*; the second, in which, once the first stage in which phenomenology was seen as psychology has been overcome, it will be explained how Husserl, especially in the *Ideas I*, formulates a neutral phenomenology suitable for psychology and transcendental phenomenology. In this part I will show the change that takes place in the mid-twenties, with the emergence of the theory of the three *egos*, fundamental to resolve the controversies about reduction and epoché. In the third part I will show the need to problematize that position from what is said at the end of the conference on "Phenomenology and Anthropology", and in §72 of *The Crisis*.

**Keywords:** Phenomenology, Psychology, Anthropology, Husserl, thee *ego*, reduction, epoché.

**Resumen:** Mi objetivo es explorar el núcleo aporético de la relación de la fenomenología con la psicología, que pasará por tres etapas, una primera en la que la fenomenología es un tipo de psicología; una segunda, en la que Husserl distingue perfectamente la fenomenología de la psicología; y una tercera, que podríamos calificar como un tránsito de la claridad de la separación, de la segunda etapa, a la imbricación. El ensayo tendrá, entonces, tres partes; primero, delinearé la exposición de Husserl de su fenomenología como una psicología descriptiva en la primera edición de las *Investigaciones lógicas*; la segunda, en la que, una vez superada la primera etapa en que la fenomenología se veía como psicología, se expondrá cómo Husserl, sobre todo en *Ideas I*, formula una fenomenología neutral apta para la psicología y la fenomenología trascendental. En esta parte mostraré el cambio que sucede a mitades de la década de los años veinte, con la aparición de la teoría de los tres *yo*s, fundamental para resolver las polémicas sobre la reducción y la *epoché*. En la tercera parte mostraré la necesidad de problematizar esa posición desde lo que se dice al final de la conferencia sobre "Fenomenología y Antropología", y en el § 72 de *La crisis*.

**Palabras clave:** Fenomenología, Psicología, Antropología, Husserl, tres *yo*s, reducción, *epoché*.

**Resumo:** Meu objetivo é explorar o núcleo aporético da relação da fenomenologia com a psicologia, que passará por três estágios, um primeiro no qual a fenomenologia é um tipo de psicologia; um segundo, no qual Husserl distingue perfeitamente a fenomenologia da psicologia; e um terceiro, que poderíamos descrever como uma transição da clareza da separação, do segundo estágio para a sobreposição. O ensaio terá três partes. Primeiro, descreverei a exposição de Husserl de sua fenomenologia como psicologia descritiva na primeira edição das *Investigações Lógicas*; o segundo, no qual, uma vez superada a primeira etapa em que a fenomenologia foi vista como psicologia, será exposto como Husserl, especialmente nas *Idéias I*, formula uma fenomenologia neutra adequada à psicologia e à fenomenologia transcendental. Nesta parte, mostrarei a mudança que ocorre em meados da década de 20, com o surgimento da teoria dos três *eus*, fundamental para resolver as controvérsias sobre redução e *epoché*. Na terceira parte, mostrarei a necessidade de problematizar essa posição a partir do que é dito no final da conferência sobre "Fenomenologia e Antropologia" e no § 72 da Crise.

**Palavras-chave:** Fenomenologia, Psicologia, Antropologia, Husserl, três *eus*, redução, *epoché*.

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My objective is to explore the aporetic core of the relation of phenomenology with psychology, which will go through three stages, a first one in which phenomenology is a type of psychology; a second, in which Husserl perfectly distinguishes phenomenology from descriptive psychology, with which he had initially identified it, and explanatory psychology is totally discarded; and a third, which we could qualify as a transition from the clarity of separation, from the second stage, to an overlapping. The essay will then have three parts. First, I will outline how Husserl understands the relationship of phenomenology with psychology in the *Logical Investigations*; the second, in which the first stage in which phenomenology was seen as psychology has been overcome, will expose how Husserl formulates a neutral phenomenology suitable for psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Both are distinguished by being elaborated from different attitudes, the psychological phenomenological attitude and the transcendental phenomenological attitude, to which is accessed through the practice of transcendental reduction. In this part I will show the change that happens in the mid-twenties, with the appearance of the theory of the three *egos*, fundamental to resolve the controversies about reduction and epoché.

From the distinction of the three *egos*, transcendental reduction is the discovery of the transcendental *ego* in the human ego. Once this is exposed, in the third part I will address the change of position or deepening in the Husserlian proposal, taking as a guide the perplexity caused by Husserl's text of § 72 of *The Crisis*, for which I give the interpretation by Iso Kern, and which must be understood from the final sentences of the lecture on "Phenomenology and Anthropology" from 1931, and which cannot but make us review the set of previous interpretations.

## 1. Pure phenomenology and psychology

We all know that Husserl in *Logical Investigations* considers his studies as studies of descriptive psychology, in the circle of Brentano's psychology. The fact that Dilthey does not appear even once in the two volumes of that work should not be underestimated. Husserl has already refuted psychologism in his first volume, which is the attempt to establish a psychological foundation of logical products, but thinking in a psychology conceived as natural science. Descriptive psychology was a far cry from scientific psychology in the naturalistic sense that stems from Weber and Fechner's experiments. We have, therefore, in the 1900s, two psychologies, the descriptive one, fundamentally developed by Brentano and Dilthey; and the other, empirical psychology, which was beginning to develop, following the guidelines of the aforementioned physiologists. However, in the text of 1901 there are undoubted fluctuations in the sense of what Husserl is doing, between phenomenology and descriptive psychology, in any case clearly ruling out explanatory psychology. Let's see it.

In the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*, which, as known, is an essay to see how these logical contents appear in the conscious life in which the logical products must take place, there are several references to descriptive psychology. Already on page 4 he defines "pure phenomenology" as a "neutral research field" in which various sciences will have their roots, for example, "psychology as empirical science".<sup>1</sup> After this (Hua XIX/1, 10) he talks about the "phenomenology of logical experiences that must give us the" descriptive understanding of these psychic phenomena "and that, of course, is not a" psychological-genetic understanding". On page 18 (Hua XIX / 1, 24 note 1) certain descriptions are mentioned that may serve for psychological investigations in the sense of empirical science, but which also serve us "as a basis" [*Unterlage*] for those fundamental abstractions in which ideal objects are captured.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of the same page, he comments that the descriptive investigation of the experiences of knowledge dispenses with psychological interests that tend to clarify the origin of that knowledge—which would place us in an explanatory psychology—but "we do well to speak, instead of descriptive psychology, of phenomenology" (Hua XIX / 1, 24 note 1),<sup>3</sup> but, note, because psychology tends to that explanation.

1 „Die reine Phänomenologie stellt ein Gebiet neutraler Forschungen dar, in welchem verschiedene Wissenschaften ihre Wurzeln haben. Einerseits dient sie zur Vorbereitung der Psychologie als empirischer Wissenschaft. Sie analysiert und beschreibt (speziell als Phänomenologie des Denkens und Erkennens) die Vorstellungs-, Urteils-, Erkenntniserlebnisse, die in der Psychologie ihre genetische Erklärung, ihre Erforschung nach empirisch-gesetzlichen Zusammenhängen finden sollen.“ Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, zweiter Teil, Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer, p. 4, (Hua XIX/1, 6).

2 „So kann eine und dieselbe Sphäre reiner Description zur Vorbereitung sehr verschiedener theoretischer Wissenschaften dienen. Nicht die Psychologie als volle Wissenschaft ist ein Fundament der reinen Logik, sondern gewisse Klassen von Descriptionen, welche die Vorstufe für die theoretischen Forschungen der Psychologie bilden (nämlich sofern sie die empirischen Gegenstände beschreiben, deren genetische Zusammenhänge diese Wissenschaft verfolgen will) bilden zugleich die Unterlage für jene fundamentalen Abstraktionen, in welchen der Logiker das Wesen seiner idealen Gegenstände und Zusammenhänge mit Evidenz erfasst“. The third "addition" to which this word belongs was completely reformulated in the second edition to the point of eliminating this entire paragraph, so it does not appear in the Morente and Gaos' translation. On the changes, see Hua XIX/1, p. 24. The next time it appears in the German text (p. 188; Hua XIX/1, 193) the word 'Unterlage' has been translated as 'base'. The third *Zusatz* of this § 6 changes completely in the second edition.

3 „Da es erkenntnistheoretisch von ganz einzigartiger Bedeutung ist, die rein descriptive Erforschung der Erkenntniserlebnisse, die um



That is why in the previous quote he had distinguished psychology as “volle Wissenschaft” – full science – from those parts of psychology that function as a base [Unterlage]. Since this part belongs to a science that, at bottom, tends to causally clarify knowledge, it prefers to reserve for that part of psychology the name of phenomenology, but it is clear that it moves in the field of psychological studies. After a few pages, already in the second edition, he says: “If we place ourselves in the field of pure description”, but in the first edition instead of “pure” he wrote: “in the field of psychological description”.<sup>4</sup> It is an indication of the change introduced. A similar change appears on p. 42 of the first edition, at the end of § 10, where he writes: “For the psychological (purely phenomenological) descriptive consideration there are only weavings [Gewebe<sup>5</sup>] of such intentional acts”.<sup>6</sup> In the second edition (Hua XIX/1, p. 48), he removes the parentheses and the words “psychological descriptive”.

At the end of § 14 (Hua XIX/1, 52), when exposing the difference between the subjective and the objective content of an expression, with respect to the first, it appears, in the first edition, as a subjective content in a phenomenological, descriptive-psychological and real empirical meaning, and therefore offers three perspectives. In the second edition (Hua XIX/1, p. 57) he eliminates this tripartition. According to the assumed orientation, the phenomenological meaning would be identical to the descriptive-psychological one, but in any case there would also be a real empirical meaning, because it would be an entity or event for which it is the task of psychology as an empirical science to search for the cause. Later on the book (Hua XIX/1, 67) he talks about the “retarded state of descriptive psychology [zurückgebliebenen Stand]” (Husserl, 2001, 206), a statement that is maintained in the second edition.

In § 23 of the Second Investigation, the phenomenological content is mentioned, which is between parentheses called psychological descriptive (p. 162); these parentheses are removed in the second edition (Hua XIX/1, 167). In § 31, the descriptive psychological analysis of acts (p. 182) becomes only a descriptive analysis (Hua XIX/1, p. 188). The same after a few pages – in § 37, p. 195–, where he talks about: “the sensed contents of the appearance of a sphere (as moments that allows finding the descriptive psychological analysis)”, this being written between parentheses; This phrase in the second edition has become “the sensed contents of the appearance of a sphere (as moments that descriptive analysis can find phenomenologically) (Hua XIX/1, 201). On page 206 of the first edition (Hua XIX/1, 211), he acknowledges in a note the contributions of William James to descriptive psychology and that it has helped him in overcoming Psychologism. This “acknowledgment” disappears in the second edition.

In the introduction to the V Investigation (Hua XIX/1, p. 353) he refers to the discussion of acts in descriptive psychology and, therefore, he who moves within the scope of that type of psychology begins by describing them as intentional experiences. This reference to descriptive psychology is maintained in the second edition (ib.). On page 344 (from the edition 1901, Hua XIX/1, 377) he refers to Brentano’s descriptive psychology, who is the one that formalizes the concept of “psychic phenomenon”.

But it is evident that this position of Husserl was not fixed. He was dealing with a notion of phenomenology which totally excludes the intention, essential for a psychology as an empirical science, to search for the causal bases of these phenomena. As the editor of the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* in *Husserliana* (Hua XIX), Ursula Panzer says that Husserl already in 1903 distances himself from that denomination of descriptive psychology, whose research he had started with:

Already in 1903 Husserl distanced himself from the denomination of his phenomenological analyzes as descriptive psychology. The reason for this is that traditional descriptive psychology conceives the experiences and classes of experiences that it investigates as characteristic of empirical people, that is, as temporally determinable facts of nature, while Husserl’s purely phenomenological analyzes suspend all hypotheses on the psychophysical and physical dependence of psychic experiences, as well as the existential position of physical nature.<sup>7</sup>

In a text from 1913, Husserl comments on the misunderstanding in which, due to the urgency of publishing the *Logical Investigations*, he felt when he understood his analyzes as descriptive psychology. In that text he refers to the same one that Ursula Panzer quotes from 1903.<sup>8</sup> Husserl’s pages devoted

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alle theoretisch -psychologischen Interessen unbekümmert ist, von der eigentlich psychologischen, auf empirische Erklärung und Genesis abzielende Forschung zu sondern, thun wir gut daran, anstatt von deskriptiver Psychologie vielmehr von Phänomenologie [19] zu sprechen. Dies empfiehlt sich auch aus dem anderen Grunde, weil der Ausdruck deskriptive Psychologie in der Redeweise mancher Forscher die Sphäre wissenschaftlicher psychologischer Untersuchungen bezeichnet, die durch die methodische Bevorzugung der inneren Erfahrung und durch Abstraction von aller psychophysischen Erklärung umgrenzt wird.“

4 Husserl 1901, Hua XIX/1, 43, n. 3.

5 Husserl’s relatives were, in Prosnitz, [present Prostejov], cloth merchants, so this word appears to designate the warp constituted by intentional acts; Husserl conceives of this way of being as a “weave”.

6 This sentence is missing in the English translation (see Husserl, 2001, 194).

7 „Bereits 1903 distanziert sich Husserl von der Bezeichnung seiner phänomenologischen Analysen de Erkenntniserlebnisse als deskriptive Psychologie. Der Grund dafür ist, dass die traditionelle deskriptive Psychologie die von ihr untersuchten Erlebnisse und Erlebnisklassen als solche von empirischen Personen, d.h. als objektiv-zeitlich bestimmbar Naturtatsachen [cvs. JSM] fasst, während Husserls rein phänomenologische Analysen jede Hypothese über die psychophysische und physische Abhängigkeit der psychischen Erlebnisse zusammen mit der existenzialen Setzung der Physischen Natur suspendieren“. (Hua XVIII, Einleitung, p. XLVII).

8 6) „Große Mängel der ersten Bearbeitung hängen damit zusammen, dass ich das Werk veröffentlichen musste, ehe die gewonnenen



to this are decisive.<sup>9</sup> Only two years had passed since the publication of the *Logical Investigations*, and Husserl already realizes that that part of psychology that should serve as a basis or support [*Unterlage*] for scientific psychology does not belong to it, because it is only a basis; it is an independent science, it is pure phenomenology. Henceforth, at least from 1903 on until the end of his life, this problem, the relationship of denial but at the same time intimate connection and closeness of phenomenology with psychology,<sup>10</sup> will be one of the most important problems of Husserlian phenomenology. This refers fundamentally to the effect that the practice of epoché and reduction has.

The fundamental basis is that the reduction of the logical to psychology “has no more value than a reduction of arithmetic to a psychology of counting in the “correct” way<sup>11</sup> (Hua XXII, 208). It is true that arithmetic is in intimate connection with correct counting, but not because “correct counting” grounds arithmetic, but, conversely, it is correct by the laws of mathematics itself. The same would happen with the experiences of logic, for example, truth and evidence. They do not exist because someone lives them, but they are lived for the intrinsic and objective value they have. That is why the clarification of the concepts proper to logic is not logical thinking, nor is it psychology, if we use this name in the usual sense, “in the same way that physics, the science of nature in the usual sense, is science of the corporal facts, thus is psychology the empirical science (science of nature) of spiritual facts” (Hua XXII, 206), both sciences depart from the world with their division of facts into spiritual and bodily facts; they suppose pre-given objectifications, the possibility of which they do not need to clarify, as seen by the success of these sciences, apart from the criticism of scientific knowledge. Husserl points out some of these pre-critical objectifications, for example, the difference between the self and the non-self; between the self and the other self, “With interpretative interpolations of immediate givenness of consciousness as ‘activities and psychic states’ in the self and with its interpretative movements of things and physical states, of ‘alien’ people, experiences, etc. outside of me.”<sup>12</sup>

All these objectifications generate metaphysical problems about the possibility of knowledge, which requires, in turn, a clarification of knowledge “regardless of all metaphysical intentions” (ib.). But this requires a phenomenology of knowledge, to fix and bring to light the experiences of knowledge in which logical ideas arise, “staying away from any interpretation that goes beyond the real contents”<sup>13</sup> of those experiences: “That is why phenomenology should not be designated as ‘descriptive psychology’. It is not strictly and properly speaking” (ib.). Because, and now it will offer us one of the reasons that will demand more effort, the descriptions of phenomenology “do not refer to experiences and classes of experiences of empirical people” (ib. lin. 38 f.), Because “phenomenology knows nothing and suspects nothing of people, of me and the other, of my experiences or those of others”, neither asks questions about it, nor wants to determine anything about real beings, nor does it make any hypotheses, etc., we are only interested in “what is given in the strict sense”, the appearance of things, not the thing that appears.

The result is an intuitive and adequate abstraction, which brings to the conscious being in an evident way the “universal essence” of logical ideas, thus clarifying the figurative and symbolic improprieties that permeate thoughts. I can always psychologically take advantage of these analysis, then they become descriptive psychological analysis, which will function as infrastructures [*Unterlage*] for the explanations of psychology, “the natural science of spiritual phenomena” (XXII, 207).

Husserl wrote and published this in 1903, with it all the bases for the phenomenological method were already exposed, and from then on, he will try to offer a method for clarifying this rupture, that he publishes for the first time in 1903 to ensure the field of phenomenology, what Husserl will do, first, through the theory of epoché, which will initially include a consequent reduction and, later, with an epoché, which, without being the reduction, leads to it, even if, just at that moment, changes its own quality, because once reduction has been practiced, the epoché that has driven to it will be redefined.<sup>14</sup>

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Einsichten sich innerlich gefestigt hatten bzw. ehe ich sie in voller Freiheit handhaben konnte. Die verschiedenen Stücke erwachsen zu verschiedenen Zeiten und eine Überarbeitung war zuletzt nötig, um alle auf einen Standpunkt zu bringen. Bei der inneren Unsicherheit verfiel ich aber während der Ausarbeitung öfters in die alten Denkgewohnheiten oder war unfähig, Unterscheidungen, die ich in einem Zusammenhang schon erkannt hatte, überall konsequent durchzuführen. Insbesondere gilt das auch für das Verhältnis zwischen deskriptiver Psychologie und Phänomenologie.“ (Husserliana XX/1, 312).

9 Cf. Hua XXII, p. 205-208.

10 To the extent that psychology is very close to anthropology, this problem, as we will see at the end of the *Vortrag* “Phenomenology and Anthropology” (Husserl 1988d), also involves anthropology.

11 We will use this example more explicitly later.

12 (ib.), “—mit ihren deutenden Einlegungen der unmittelbaren Bewusstseinsgegebenheiten als „psychischen Tätigkeiten und Zuständen“ in das eigene Ich und ihren deutenden Hinausverlegungen von physischen Dingen und Zuständen, von „fremden“ Personen, Erlebnissen usw. ausserhalb des Ichs“.

13 „unter Fernhaltung aller über ihren realen Inhalt hinausgehenden Deutung“ (ib.).

14 This is one of the core points of my interpretation of the relationship between epoché and reduction —which already appears in my doctoral thesis from 1972 — which is based on what Husserl says in the Manuscript B I 5/IX, esp. p. 24 (since 2002 published as No. 15 of Husserliana XXXIV. See esp. p. 233). Gerd Brand was the first scholar to draw attention to this situation, citing that manuscript. See Brand 1955, p. 33 f. Cf. also San Martín 1986, 185. There I also provide the quotation, in the same sense of EPh II, Hua VIII, 480. In the book from 1986, there is an error in the manuscript number, which is not X but IX. For the rest, it is regrettable that this important finding by Brand, on which I built my thesis in 1972 and made public in 1986, was practically ineffective.



## 2. The relationship of transcendental phenomenology with psychology

I still want to indicate an interesting fact about this situation. Husserl exposes with great precision in § 3 of his 1925 lessons on phenomenological psychology the history of the passage from the *Logical Investigations*, which were regarded as descriptive psychology, to the new consideration. In that text there is a very interesting confession. Husserl indicates there that he moved towards Brentano's path (Hua IX, 33 s.), of whom he was a student, and that in the line of descriptive psychology he formulates a phenomenology that is a deepening of Brentano's intention, but that neither Brentano nor his disciples took it that way, but Dilthey did; but Husserl, for his part, as we have already said, did not mention the latter in the *Logical Investigations*. Despite this, for this thinker, the *Logical investigations* offered the foundation of those sciences of spirit that he was also looking for. This attention of Dilthey impacted Husserl,<sup>15</sup> and thus, since 1905, he will understand his phenomenology as the true philosophy of the human sciences.

Husserl fully developed his theory in those years with complete clarity: the epoché is a bracketing of the position of reality proper to the natural attitude, with which the reality of the world, with everything included in it, remains out of consideration. In §§ 53 and 54 of *Ideas I* he carefully exposes this position applied to the characteristic of the conscious being proper to animals and human beings. Here the psychological attitude is already explained, which considers these beings, with their conscious peculiarity, as elements of the natural world, a world that has been, in its feature of reality, placed between brackets. That is why, regarding psychic phenomena, those of other humans, and even those of animals, there are two attitudes, depending on whether or not the phenomenological epoché has been applied: a psychological attitude, in which we look at those psychic phenomena capturing them as parts of reality, since they are phenomena that happen in a body; or a phenomenological attitude in which we disconnect that what belongs to a reality:

On the other hand, we have the phenomenological attitude concomitantly interwoven as an essential possibility, which, reflecting and disconnecting the transcendent positions, turns to the pure absolute conscious being and finds at that moment the apperception of conditionality of an absolute experience. [nun die Zuständlichkeitsapperzeption eines absoluten Erlebnisses vorfindet] (Hua III/1, 118)

Husserl spoke of joy as “an experiential conditionality”, that is, an experiential state perceived as characteristic of the human being, therefore, real. Now Husserl means that this state is perceived as a pure experience, which, therefore, does not depend on a reality, but, insofar as it is perceived as a state of a human being, it is an element of psychology. From this observation Husserl draws the consequence that what was discovered in pure phenomenology is valid for transcendental phenomenology and for eidetic psychology, which is the psychology that has replaced that previous descriptive psychology.

Husserl's position, which will be maintained throughout his later developments, leads him to think that one must ensure a specific way of looking for this eidetic psychology and another to ensure the transcendental perspective. These considerations are after the *Ideas I*.

In addition, along with this, there will be a very important development in the twenties on the relationship of the phenomenological attitudes –achieved by what will already be two reductions, the psychological and the transcendental– with the eidetic reduction, for in the first developments there is a clear confusion between phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction, because by putting the empirical reality in brackets, we are left with the essential reality. Over time Husserl will clarify this point. It is true that all non idiographic science is science of essences, but it is not true that an eidetic attitude is necessarily involved in a psychological phenomenological attitude. The eidetic attitude is a requirement to convert my individual phenomenological experience into a scientific one, because by itself the phenomenological look at the experience is not eidetic, but rather individual. It is necessary to take the case through eidetic variation or another method as an essential example.

The same is true in the case of transcendental phenomenological reduction: to make transcendental reduction the gateway to transcendental phenomenology as a science, an eidetic reduction is required, which is different from the transcendental one. If it seemed initially that we had obtained an essential intuition, because of the loss of reference to reality, as we saw in 1903, Husserl will realize that this is not the case. There is a note in *Husserliana XIII*, referring to the *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* lessons, in which this structure is clearly perceived. Explaining phenomenological reduction, Husserl warns in a note from the twenties that we have not yet practiced eidetic reduction, therefore, that we are at a pre-scientific level, because we are considering individualities, although we are at a transcendental level. (Hua XIII, 162; Husserl 2006, 56, note 6; cf. also San Martín 2020, 53 s.)

<sup>15</sup> “Überraschend war für mich u. sehr ermutigend die fast zu überschwängliche Anerkennung Dilthey's” [I was surprised and very encouraged by the almost exaggerated recognition of Dilthey]; see letter to William Ernest Hocking, from 10/8/1905 (Husserl 1994b, 157). On this relationship, the letter to Mahnke from 12/26/1927 is very famous, in which he accurately relates this episode and what it represented to him. Cfr. Husserl 1994b, 459; also Pfänder's letter to Husserl of 07/31/1905, in Husserl 1994a, 134.



In order to broach the subject of the third part, I still need to consider one more point. Until the twenties, specifically until 1922, Husserl considered epoché and reduction to be practically the same. In the London conferences (Hua XXXV, 273<sup>16</sup>) he talks about the *einklammernde Reduktion*, an expression that mixes the characteristic of “putting in brackets”, which is typical of epoché, with reduction. But Husserl’s question about the position of the ego in the reduction debate, which took place in those years, leads him to a very important conclusion, namely, to clearly separate, first, the human being, who says ego himself, therefore, the ego in the natural attitude; second, the phenomenologist, the ego that does phenomenology and that reflects on human life, and discovers in it, by practicing epoché, that this human being is, third, a transcendental ego. This division is of great importance, because it clarifies the position of the conscious being. The human being is a conscious being, it is I who see myself in the world, as determined by the world, in which I occupy a place in the composition and relationship with the rest of things; but by the operation of the epoché, an absolute experience is discovered in myself, an experience, a conscious life that, being absolute, does not need any other reality to exist. That is the meaning of the human being, that absolute character. That only means that nothing appears in human experience that makes it causally dependent on worldly circumstances, on worldly causality. As much as I delve into my experience, I will never find the cause of an experience of mine, I will find concomitances, for example, that if I move my head, what I see varies; that if I fix my attention, other things appear; that certain things affect me; that I feel moved by a value; that I know something; that I like and want something; that I do something, and that is my life, but that conscious life is in itself “absolute”, that is, separated from all determination, it determines itself, and finds itself in a network of motivations and affections— these as passivities, things that happen to me— that is why it has elements of a passivity, on which it reacts, but we can never find a causality in the proper sense of the natural sciences that determines it.

This discovery is the product of the methodological operation of the phenomenologist, who establishes himself as a disinterested spectator of his own life, in this case, of myself as a conscious being, to discover this duality of myself as a human being, part of the world, and an “absolute” experience of the world.

### **3. Towards a new theory of the relationship between psychology and transcendental phenomenology**

With such considerations Husserl takes a very important step, because he sets in motion the deepest reflection in relation to psychology, and beyond it, also with anthropology. The anthropology that, at that time—in the twenties—was beginning to take shape and form, to the point that the great philosophers began to take it into consideration. It is also very important because it clarifies what the three fundamental elements of the method of access to the field of phenomenology mean, and it is where the relationship of Husserlian phenomenology with psychology and anthropology will be redefined.

The identity of the ego that I am and in the world, and the ego that sees himself as subject of world, is not a matter that leaves Husserl indifferent, because the key point is that “the same”, the elements that I discover as constituents of the conscious being are, therefore, parts of the subject of the world—for the world appears to be conscious, to that subject—but that conscious being is, at the same time, a being in the world. This is what Husserl would call the “aporetic situation” for those years, which ends up appearing with that name in *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, but which configures the folder B I 14, one of the most important manuscript folders, which, although it is not very large—it has only 178 manuscript sheets—covers the years from 1923 to 1935, and is entitled “enigma”, “paradoxes” (see Hua XXXIV, 544). In this folder, in my opinion, the great problems of methodology are condensed, which in *The Crisis* span many pages, but which represent a problem that begins with the redefinition of phenomenological reduction in the early twenties. When it is said that *The Crisis* represents a late break in Husserl’s phenomenology, after Hitler’s seizure of power, such a claim is radically false. These problems start from the reflection on the methodology of 1922/23, which begins with the lessons *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Hua XXXV); much earlier, therefore, also to the appearance of *Being and Time* (1927) by Heidegger.

The core of the redefinition consists in the distinction, in the human being who is the phenomenologist, of the human being as object in the world and the human being as subject of the world, the transcendental aspect of human life, which, on the other hand, makes the human being what it is. And there the relationship of transcendental phenomenology with psychology and philosophical anthropology is rooted, because it is a matter of precisely understanding the status of being conscious in this double version, of being an entity determined by the world and, at the same time, an entity that operates as the central focus of the world’s experience. Transcendental phenomenology studies this last aspect, while the former is studied by psychology, while philosophical anthropology should study the human being as such.

The key question is, if the conscious being, as being determined by the world, is the object of psychology, how can that conscious being as a fact of the world—that is, what it means to be an entity determined by the world— go beyond the contingency that is proper to the facts determined by other

<sup>16</sup> Husserl Studies 16: 183-254, 2000, p. 233.



facts, when knowledge, assessment and action are subject to rules that do not depend on those facts? To understand this I am going to use an example, with a triple objective; first, to show that this problem is present in Husserl from the beginning; second, to show the limitation of psychology, explaining its manifest limitation in this case; and third, going to a text from 1926 (from folder B I 14) to show that the problem of *The Crisis* reflects Husserl's progress in the twenties.

The example refers to the action of counting, to which we have already referred, and which was an example of Husserl himself. There is a correct count and a wrong count. Psychology can produce a report on this distinction. Now, how can one define that a count is correct? Only if it has been subjected to rules that determine, for example, that if I add a unit, I will have one more unit, and not one less. This simple rule does not depend on any fact, because no fact could vary that law, which means that, if it is broken, the count is incorrect. If psychology wants to understand the phenomenon of counting, it cannot consider the human being and in this case his action of calculating as a mere fact resulting from events, for example, brain events. It must count, unfailingly, on the rules of arithmetic. But, then, is it still psychology or has it not passed to the transcendental dimension of the human being?

With this the first objective is identified. The second is shown to us because what I have just said is nothing but a return to the refutation of the Psychologism in the *Logical investigations*. Although the example is not from Husserl in this book, the meaning of the refutation of Psychologism is exactly that: the laws that regulate the intellectual behavior of the human being are not deduced from psychic activities. Counting or calculating correctly does not depend on psychological activities but on the application of arithmetic laws whose truth is independent of human facticity. I use the word 'facticity' to include Heidegger in this refutation, for the author of *Being and Time* bases all in the analysis of the facticity of a Being for death, whose horizon is therefore that finitude.

The third objective of my example is grounded on the fact that this problem is already present in a text from the mid-twenties, so it is not a topic that came up in *The Crisis* for the first time, as it is often said. In fact, text number 57 of Hua XXXIX is from 1929 and belongs to folder B I 14, on the paradoxes of human experience. Various aspects of these paradoxes are discussed here. With that we know the problems of psychology, and we will see that Husserl ends up transferring this position to philosophical anthropology. But to continue, I will first use the problem with psychology, to end by commenting on the famous lecture from 1931 that Husserl gave in Berlin, Frankfurt and Halle, which presents a very special situation in relation to our problem.

Husserl's words in *The Crisis*, § 72 (Hua VI, 261; 1970, 257f.), in which he insists that "There is only a transcendental psychology, which is identical with transcendental philosophy. [...] Thus pure psychology in itself is identical with transcendental philosophy as the science of transcendental subjectivity.", were always a challenge for me. As it is known, this phrase caused not only doubts but Iso Kern's rejection, who thought that it was a lapse of Husserl for being a very old person, close to eighty years, since at that time he was seventy-seven years old:

Let us emphasize, however, that this extraordinarily problematic identification was not always defended, but can eventually be clarified simply by the incomplete nature of the work, which, moreover, comes from the hand of an early octogenarian.<sup>17</sup>

I was always struck by Kern's criticism of these sentences of Husserl, and then he would question, not only that page, but, coherently, the entire book *The Crisis*.<sup>18</sup> That is why I have spoken of the third objective, to show that the problem of *The Crisis* is based on the developments of the twenties. This already appears in the Lectures first read in 1920 and repeated in 1924. The text appears in an Attachment to § 11 of the Lecture, which deals with naturalistic and phenomenological psychology. The text could have been written on the same date or taken from another text but added by Husserl to that paragraph of the lecture, therefore it comes from 1920, although Husserl notes on the page were not read, and therefore, he already had it in that moment (see Hua XXXVII, 496). Husserl says:

A purely phenomenological psychology, which in turn is indissolubly one with the psychology of passive psychic interiority with its passive motivations. But it turns out that the most essential thing to do here and without which nothing seriously valuable can be obtained is an a priori psychology, namely, as a theory of the pure essence of an ego and its active and passive life. In this purity that is nothing more than pure phenomenology—even in attitude—as long as it is necessary, if we want to know the factual life of the ego of factual subjectivity in empirical science (Hua XXXVII, p. 356).

<sup>17</sup> "Heben wir aber hervor, dass diese äusserst bedenkliche Identifikation von Husserl nicht immer vertreten wurde, sondern eventuell einfach durch den unvollendeten Charakter jenes Werkes, das zudem aus der Hand eines bald Achtzigjährigen stammt, erklärt werden kann." (See Kern, 1964, p. 217).

<sup>18</sup> I would like to take this opportunity to point out that there are commentators who have got an idea of Husserl that does not fit with *The Crisis* and then add that this book is a late work inconsistent with Husserl's career. This is much more frequent than is believed. On the other hand, it is not a novelty, because that is what Ortega said in 1941, when he realized that this publication disavowed his version of phenomenology, which by then he said he had overcome. Faced with this dilemma, he concluded that this work had been written by Eugen Fink. See Ortega 1941, p. 29, note.



I suspect, by the way, that this “factual” must be understood in the context of analytics of facticity by Heidegger, who was Husserl’s assistant and was giving lectures the time. It is very likely that Husserl received news about these analytics. This text tells us that pure psychology is a priori, that it includes passivity, not only activity, that is, intellectual operations, but that this psychology is none other than phenomenology but, even in attitude, that is to say, which requires the same type of methodology, therefore, the practice of epoché. That is why the attachment ends with a very clear statement of this problem:

But a study of the soul structures in its interior, the soul analysis in its true “soul element”, that is the phenomenological analysis, and this ultimately requires transcendental knowledge, which transfers the knowledge of objectivity to the subjectivity of the constitution and it makes her so understandable, to her and to spirituality (Hua XXXVII, p. 356).

At the time I discovered an important reference to this same point in K. Schuhmann’s *Husserl’s Chronik*, which, due to the dates it refers to, is of utmost importance. This is the manuscript cataloged in the Husserl Archives as B I 9/I IV, with the title “For the theory of pre-givenness” [*Zur Lehre der Vorgegebenheit*]. The folder does not indicate that something of it has been published, although in Hua IX Annex IX, XX, XXI and XXXI have been taken from this folder, but after page 47 of the manuscript, which has a total of 110 sheets. Schuhmann’s summary of this text is extremely important for the date, since it is assigned to April-June 1931, just when he is preparing the conference that he will give in June on phenomenology and anthropology. Regarding this, he wrote to Ingarden on 19 April of that year: “I have to speak in Berlin, Halle and Frankfurt about Phenomenology and anthropology and I must read accurately my antipodes Scheler and Heidegger”.<sup>19</sup> That is why this manuscript, unfortunately not published, is especially interesting, but the summary of those pages opens up a whole world for us. Schuhmann, in addition to the mentioned title, gives us the summary of those 22/33 pages:

Pre-givenness includes the possibility of natural and personal attitude. Pure, therefore, universal psychology becomes a transcendental philosophy. Starting point from, the animal and the human being” (Schumann, 1977, p. 378 f.)

According to the manuscript, if psychology is consistent, it must become transcendental phenomenology. It is, on the other hand, interesting that Husserl in that same manuscript warns that the starting point is from the animal and the human being, that both are beings in the world. It is curious and it does not fail to draw attention to the fact that the same theme appears in that text that I have quoted from the ethics lessons, even if only from the Excursus, and that it is in the ethics lectures in which the problem of comparison of the human being with the animal often appears. Furthermore, all this, including this manuscript B I 9 is generally entitled “Anthropologie-Psychologie”. As can be seen very well, there is a line of continuity in this theme from the 1920 text to *The Crisis*, with the text that Iso Kern attributed to Husserl’s old age.

Well, let us come, finally, to the famous Lecture delivered in June 1931, which, unfortunately, has led to a terrible misunderstanding in this regard. It is quite possible that, without this misunderstanding, Iso Kern would have interpreted the text of *The Crisis* differently. What is the misunderstanding about this lecture, in which Husserl wants to make things clear regarding the two authors who, from the letter to Ingarden, we know that he considered their antipodes?

The lecture was published in Volume II, No. 1 of the journal founded by Marvin Farber, *Philosophy and phenomenological Research*. We have all read that lecture that ends very clearly:

Once anyone has seriously understood what is aimed at here, what has been here opened up in concrete work and with the most compelling evidence as systematic theory, then, there can be no doubt that there is only *one* definitive philosophy, only *one* form of definitive science, which is the science elaborated by the originary method of transcendental phenomenology. (Hua XXVII, 179; transl, 1997, 499).

Where does the profound misunderstanding by this lecture come from? The publication of the lecture, which was in charge of Fink, omitted the last two pages of the conference in which Husserl recovers the idea that we have seen before that psychology—and according to this conference, also anthropology—if they are consequential until the end, become transcendental philosophy. It was not until the entire conference was published in 1988 that we learned that the one published by Fink was biased and lacked what made the conference most meaningful. But because we all who were familiar with these topics of Husserl had read

<sup>19</sup> «Ich soll in Berlin (10. 6.), in Halle u. Frankfurt über Phän[omenologie] u. Anthropologie sprechen (Kant-Ges[ellschaft]) u. muß meine Antipoden Scheler u. Heidegger genau lesen», in Husserl, 1956, p. 67. Also in Husserl 1994b, 273 s.





the published lecture, which had also been translated into other languages, did not care to read it correctly in the corresponding volume, *Husserliana XXVII*, 1988, where the lecture, by the first time, appears in full.

What had happened? It was a mistake with the conference transcripts. I gather here the explanation that I give in a note at a paper to be published by the CLAFEN conference, where I deal broadly with this problem:

Husserl wrote a first version [V. 1] of the lecture, and then a second one [V. 2], in which he remakes the version one, and which is the one he reads in the conferences. But the first version [V. 1] had two pages that Husserl doesn't rework for version two [V. 2], whether because he already thought they were well written, or because he didn't have time. We know that Husserl, at least in Berlin, read these two pages and presumably he did so in Frankfurt and Halle as well. The first version [V. 1] was paginated with Roman numerals and ended with those two pages following this Roman numeration of the version one. When they were saved, these two pages were put back in their place following the Roman numeration, that is, in V. 1. Thus, the version that Husserl read, V. 2, was left without those last two pages of the first version. Fink, transcribing it, transcribed and published the version Husserl read without those two sheets. They begin by citing Scheler and we know that he did it in Berlin (on June 10), because the press comments that he refers to him. We do not know about the other places, in Frankfurt (June 1, 1931) and in Halle (June 16) because there are no comments. That is the copy published by Fink, which is missing the last paragraphs corresponding to those two pages of the manuscript.

Precisely those paragraphs are the ones that interest us here. The translation that has circulated in Spanish has been done from the publication of Fink. Perhaps this is the reason why these last paragraphs, which are absolutely fundamental,<sup>20</sup> have not been carefully studied. Perhaps, if the translator of this lecture in the recent publication *Textos breves* (1887-1936) [*Short Texts*] had read all these paragraphs in depth, he would not have been so categorical in a problem in full swing. Indeed, Agustín Serrano de Haro says, in the presentation of the text: that Husserl

Without rhetoric or delay, he faces a position on the question of how the philosophical question for the human being cannot be the way of foundation of philosophy. Full responsibility for the truth, which distinguishes thought and keeps it alive, would be incompatible with a philosophical anthropology either as a first philosophy or as a fundamental ontology. (Serrano de Haro, 2019, 528).

Let us begin by saying that one must bear in mind that Husserl rewrites the entire conference but these last two pages. That means that Husserl firmly bears the message that appears in them, so firmly that it came out in the first version. The paragraph that I have already quoted in the first of the two missing pages is followed by one in the same direction—which indicates the continuation of the pages, even with the renewed one—but the rest or until the end of the lecture is already in the way of what we have seen in the ethics lectures and in the manuscript of that same time. With this I want to finish.

What is essential in these few paragraphs? First, Husserl rejects both Heidegger's philosophy, whom he does not quote, and Scheler's philosophy, whom he quotes adjectively, Schelerian ontological idealism. Regarding Heidegger, he considers that his philosophy is an "theory of the human being", "Lehre vom Menschen", empirical or apriori. Husserl says: the "Philosophie vom menschlichen Dasein" falls into naivety. It is evident that Heidegger is here the one alluded to.

The second thing Husserl does is to regret that he can only touch superficially the parallelism between the human being and the self, and here he draws on that theory that he had exposed in the ethics lessons and in the manuscript summarized by K. Schuhmann, that pure or phenomenological psychology ends up being transcendental phenomenology, which is exactly what he will say in *The Crisis*.

The third important point is that the problem of descriptive or pure psychology is extended to philosophical anthropology, which means that anthropology is the same case of psychology. Exactly, an important task is to clarify this point, which has its complexity, because it has just told us that "every theory of the human being [that is, every anthropology, empirical or a priori] supposes the world".

So, all my effort will go to understand this, because the same must be true for psychology. The only difference is that it has been psychology that in the Modern Age has assumed the role of being a transcendental foundation of philosophy, and for Husserl this is not accidental. It must be said that it was Kant who, in Wolff's scheme of scholastic philosophy, thought that philosophy should start, before metaphysics, with a psychology, which in him ended up being an anthropology.

For Husserl this continuous interweaving, mixing between philosophy and psychology, in the age of transcendental motivation, is not accidental, and all attempts at reform of psychology, descriptive psychology, both that of Brentano and the one developed by Dilthey, have been the preconditions for the understanding of the transcendental problem and the configuration of the transcendental method.

Husserl also recognizes the contrary, that the development of the true transcendental phenomenological method has not left without affecting psychology itself, on the contrary, it has reworked psychology leading to a reform of it.

<sup>20</sup> See this history in *Hua XXVII*, 259.



For Husserl, the main problem of psychology, a problem of principle, “Ihr prinzipielles Problem”, is the “psychological-phenomenological constitution of the world as a human” representation “, and he quotes the word “representation”, because there is the point where all must be settled. Along with this constitution of “representation”, the explanation of horizons of the conscious being are exposed as a method of intentional explaining based on the intentional object (Husserl 2019d, 544). And now comes the decisive paragraph: this relationship between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology requires clarification: “We must come to understand, on ultimate transcendental grounds, why psychology - or anthropology, if you wish - is in fact not just a positive science along with the natural sciences, but rather has an intrinsic affinity with philosophy, with transcendental philosophy.” (Hua XXVII, 181; transl. 500). In the following paragraph he draws the consequence of this affinity that he has established:

This clarification has made also possible and brought the following to light: When one has revealed intersubjectivity to interior psychology (which ultimately is anthropology in the pure, intellectual sense), as has now become possible, and when this has been developed as a *rational* science in unconditioned universality and breadth (as has happened from the beginning for the rational sciences of nature) - then a spontaneous tendency begins to impel psychologists to give up their naive orientedness to the world and to understand themselves as transcendental philosophers. We could even say: Once we take the idea of a positive rational knowledge of the world and think it through to the end, once we think our way through to the ultimate grounding of such a science, at that point any positive science of the world changes over into a transcendental science of the world. Positive science remains distinct from philosophy only so long as the knower remains stuck in finite matters.<sup>21</sup>

An attempt should be made to unravel to the bottom this paragraph, which is the same that appears in the ethics lectures, in the preparatory manuscript, and also in relation to the development of transcendental phenomenology from the animal to transcendental phenomenology, and finally in *The Crisis*. In the end, and with this I finish, it is nothing more than to take seriously an idea already present in the *Logical Investigations*, and which Husserl marvelously summarized in 1903/4 in the reviews of logical writing, where Husserl makes a clear summary of page 89 of the Prolegomena (first edition), which gives us a fundamental idea of his philosophy, that will remain until the final years, and which marks the guiding idea of phenomenology. Husserl says:

There (89 s.) I have also tried to show that the idea of the normal and mentally healthy human being already presupposes the idea of reason, therefore, that it is not appropriate to limit it at all, either to it or in general to the sphere of logic. (Hua XXII, p. 208).

In those pages of the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*, halfway through § 27, Husserl is describing what is the mentally healthy normal human being. This mental health includes, for example, that “No one can believe in a contradiction, no one can take something both to be and not to be - no one, that is, who is rational, to add an obvious qualification.”<sup>22</sup>, etc. The idea of the human being includes operating from reason, and at least in the foundations of human life, from belief in the world,<sup>23</sup> in the distinction of the real and unreal from the original givenness, therefore, in the understanding of the difference between

21 [This note has its full meaning related to the Spanish edition, but I think, it is also interesting for the English text of the paper] When I read the lecture in Curitiba, the excellent Spanish edition of Husserl's *Textos breves* had not yet come out. In this essay some formulas of the translation presented in that work are assumed (Husserl 2019d, 543) but not others. The fundamental difference is in the translation of *Innenpsychologie* to introspective psychology. If Husserl had wanted to use the word “introspektive Psychologie” he would have used it. In the *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (Hua IX) he always speaks of the *Innenpsychologie*, like that of Brentano and Dilthey, which is descriptive psychology. Introspection is used more in the field of experimental psychology as an aid in experiments, but we would not say that Brentano and Dilthey's psychology is introspective. At least Husserl prefers to keep the difference. This is more important since in this text he assimilates it to purely spiritual anthropology. What can we think this is? One can only think of an anthropology that describes in all its breadth the way of life of people in the world, in what, in *Ideas II*, Husserl had called personalistic attitude, which, therefore, is very close to what cultural and social anthropology has been as long as we remove from it its legitimate interest in explaining cultural differences in a mechanical way, that is, outside the free choice of individuals, in what is called an “etic” perspective. By this I mean that I exclude from that purely spiritual anthropology, for example, all understanding of the cultural as winning routines (Gustavo Bueno), which win as the mechanical imposition of a solution, as the most adapted genes are selected by the environment. In the cultural and historical there is always a choice on the part of the social group of what endures. The only exception I see to this rule is the phonetic drift that seems to occur mechanically due to variations in the pronunciation of each generation. Thus, in Spain, the pronunciation of “elle” has almost been lost. Nobody chooses it but the simplification leads to losing that sound that is more difficult than the “ye”.

22 See Hua XVIII, p. 98; trans. *Logical Investigation*, p. 62.

23 In an investigation that I am concluding about the belief, I have seen that this is the first meaning of the *doxa* in Greece, by Homer and Herodotus, and that it is also maintained by Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, the normal thing for a human being is to act *κατὰ δόξαν* and, when something goes wrong, it is *παρὰ δόξαν*. Rhetoric must always operate *κατὰ δόξαν* (Aristotle). It is a profoundly novel vision of the Greek *doxa* and above all Platonic, very opposed to the traditional one that only sees *δόξα* as opposed to episteme. In the cases mentioned above, there were no basis for speaking of opinion, because the existence of the world is not an opinion of people, and that is a *δόξα*, or counting on the street to follow when I open the door, a case that is paradigmatic when one want to illustrate what a belief is.



what is originally given and what is only represented. This was Don Quixote's mental illness, who confused what was represented with what was real, when elements referring to values appeared. That statement, which is the basis of phenomenology itself, is also the basis of psychology—and also of anthropology—and if it is consistent, it must be directed by that idea, but then it is on the cutting edge of transcendental philosophy. Psychology, if it is consistent—and the same happens with anthropology—ends up becoming transcendental knowledge about their respective objects.

With this, how should I respond to the forceful sentence of the mentioned translator of the lecture into Spanish? In a simple way: Husserl has two ideas of anthropology, one that he expresses there, an anthropology that adheres to what the human being is as an object in the world or, in any case, as part of the world. But he has another idea of anthropology, the one he calls authentic anthropology; now, since Husserl considers that the problems of psychology and anthropology are identical or, at least, close, the same is true for psychology: if there is an authentic anthropology, there will also be an authentic psychology. In the case of anthropology, that authentic anthropology must consider its object, the human being, in the fullness of its essence, that is, as a being in which the giving of the world and the appearance of rationality occurs. That givenness of the world and the working presence of rationality can in no case be attributed to the human being as an object in the world, but only as a subject for the world, for which reduction must have been practiced, or only by it can we discover that peculiarity of the human being. Transcendental phenomenology describes that human being in which transcendental and rationality occur. Because both are what they are, they overcome all confinement, for example, death, with which we are radically against Heidegger, or any ontological idealism in which ideal objects escape transcendental subjectivity, against Scheler. The human being foreseen by Husserl is a transcendental subject linked to essential legitimacies. Authentic anthropology must take into account that specific being, to the point that, if it does not, that anthropology would not be authentic, that is, transcendental, or rather it would be a biased anthropology, it could even be a parody of it, for it would be a caricature of anthropology that takes as its object a human being devoid of rational exercise, exercise that is not only another feature of human life, as Landsberg very well saw it, when he formulated an anthropology of features.

But, to elucidate all these aspects of phenomenology in its relationship with psychology is still an undecided task, because it has to dismantle the firmly installed prejudices due to the highly flawed appearance of Husserl's works. Among them, a very important one is the partial publication of the lecture on "Phenomenology and Anthropology".

On the other hand, this is a thesis that I have been defending for years, since I formulated the substance of it in the paper in the journal *Études phénoménologiques*, as early as 1991, where I defend an explicit position of Husserl that walks alongside an implicit position, which becomes visible both in the subject of psychology and in that of anthropology (cf. San Martín 1991; 2015; 2017). That is also, altogether, the meaning of my dispute with Antonio Ziri6n, which is already in its fifth season.



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