THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, IN THE LIFE-WORLD: A COMPARISON OF D. KAHNEMAN AND A. SCHUTZ'S RENDITIONS OF COMMON SENSE

Pensando, Rápido e Lento, no Mundo-de-Vida: Uma Comparação das Interpretações de Senso Comum de D. Kahneman e A. Schutz

Pensamiento, Rápido y Lento, en el Mundo de la Vida: Una Comparación de las Interpretaciones del Sentido Común de D. Kahneman y A. Schutz

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Abstract: This article comparatively examines the renditions of common sense Daniel Kahneman provides in his *New York Times* bestselling book, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (*TFS*) (2011), and Alfred Schutz harvests through his phenomenology of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) of the natural attitude. The project reviews Kahneman and Schutz's interpretations of common sense, lays out their basic correspondences and differences, and concludes with observations about their complementarity.
Keywords: common sense, phenomenology, psychology, sociology

Resumo: Este artigo examina comparativamente as interpretações do bom senso que Daniel Kahneman fornece em seu livro best-seller do *New York Times*, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (*TFS*) (2011), e que Alfred Schutz colhe através de sua fenomenologia do mundo da vida (*Lebenswelt*) da atitude natural. O projeto analisa as interpretações do senso comum de Kahneman e Schutz, expõe as suas correspondências e diferenças básicas e conclui com observações sobre a sua complementaridade.
Palavras-chave: senso comum, fenomenologia, psicologia, sociologia

Resumen: Este artículo examina comparativamente las interpretaciones del sentido común que Daniel Kahneman proporciona en su libro más vendido del *New York Times*, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (*TFS*) (2011), y Alfred Schutz deriva a través de su fenomenología del mundo de la vida (*Lebenswelt*) de la actitud natural. El proyecto revisa las interpretaciones del sentido común de Kahneman y Schutz, establece sus correspondencias y diferencias básicas, y concluye con observaciones sobre su complementariedad.
Palabras-clave: sentido común, fenomenología, psicología, sociología

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Introduction

This article comparatively examines the renditions of common sense Daniel Kahneman (K) provides in his *New York Times* bestselling book, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (*TFS*) (2011), and Alfred Schutz (S) harvests through his phenomenology of the life-world (*Lebenswelt)* of the natural attitude. The project reviews K and S's interpretations of common sense lays out their basic correspondences and differences and concludes with observations about their complementarity. Why? Because the question of common sense, the endeavor to determine what it fundamentally is and how it fundamentally operates, has become one of the more pressing questions of the 21ˢᵗ century. The struggle of engineers to replicate common sense in machines, and, perhaps more important, understand what it is they are striving to replicate, as well as the resources markets and governments are pouring into the endeavor, speak to the relevance and tenacity of the problem. So does the growing, although largely ignored, imperative to protect the public from the relentless efforts of corporate and political entities to sample common-sense notions in pursuit of their financial and strategic goals. And why comparatively examine K and S's interpretations of common sense? First, because the matter of their work, whatever either chooses to call it or how they investigate it, is common sense. It is everyday understanding and thinking, or what the social sciences denote generally as *Verstehen* (Abel, 1975; Schutz, 1954). Second, because their analyses are comprehensive, complementary, and among the best in their classes.

1. System 1

In *TFS*, K (Kahneman), an experimental psychologist and economist, presents the "current understanding" of the heuristics of judgment and decision. By this he means he reiterates the "psychological discoveries of recent decades" about the cognitive mechanics of everyday thinking (2011, p. 4). Everyday thinking, as K explains in "Part 1" of *TFS*, is interpreting that contains a motive affiliated with the day-in-day-out business of human living. It is an interpretive act that embodies a goal, reason, or project connected to a mundane course of action and includes judgments and decisions about its matter (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 19-104). The interpretive core of these judgements and decisions are heuristics. Heuristics are the unconscious interpreting processes whereby cognition automatically arrives at determinations of its matter. Their influence on judgment and decision is especially prevalent in situations where information about the matter to be judged or decided is scarce or ambiguous, which is most situations, and motivations to interpret it deliberately are absent. Heuristics are ingredient to everyday judgments and decisions; expedite their outcomes; operate smoothly, effortlessly, and silently, which is to say, unconsciously; are usually reliable; relieve cognition of the effort requisite to arriving at determinations positively correlated to an abundance of reliable information or rigorous assessments of limited data that are available; and free individuals to get on with their purposes and accomplish the business of life (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 8-13, 20-21, 28-30, 58).

Heuristics, according to K, comprise two transformations: "substitution" and "association." Substitution is the process whereby cognition automatically displaces difficult questions implied by the matter to be judged or decided with easier ones that can be answered quickly and easily (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 89, 96-98). Association is the process whereby cognition interprets its matter by corresponding it to past experiences of similar or related things or referencing things experienced (intended) simultaneously or "within a relatively short interval" (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 51-52, 71). Put differently, when a course of action obliges individuals to judge or decide something and data about it are limited, indefinite, or difficult to interpret, cognition *substitutes* questions about its determination with easier ones that it answers through *associations* referencing previous experiences of similar things or things experienced more or less concurrently (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 8, 13, 86, 415-416).

K correctly sources the term "heuristics" to "eureka" (2011, p. 98), which comes from the ancient Greek, εὕρηκᾰ (*évrika*), or, "I have discovered it;" infinitive: εὑρῐ́σκειν (*évriskēn*), "to discover." The way the term is employed in the psychological literature (and by K) is not inconsistent with its etymology, although the discovery it implies does not necessarily correspond to unearthing the truth of a matter, as indicated by its pre-philosophical articulation. Instead, it means the way a matter is questioned and interpreted, which in everyday thinking is through substitution and association, according to K. K's review of the psychology of heuristics includes a summary of the milestone studies he and his former (now deceased) collaborator, the cognitive and mathematical psychologist, Amos Tversky, conducted over the course of their careers. This work won K the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences "for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgement and decision-making under uncertainty" ("The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002: Daniel Kahneman - Facts," 2022). In its decision the Nobel committee cited two papers K and Tversky authored: "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and "Choices, Values, and Frames" (Kahneman

& Tversky, 1984). It also referenced their landmark paper, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; "The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002: Daniel Kahneman - Facts," 2022). Of Tversky, Kahneman writes:

> Amos and I enjoyed the extraordinary good fortune of a shared mind that was superior to our individual minds and of a relationship that made our work fun as well as productive. Our collaboration on judgment and decision making was the reason for the Nobel Prize that I received in 2002, which Amos would have shared had he not died, aged fifty-nine, in 1996 (2011, p. 10).

Three of the dozen or so heuristics K describes in *TFS* and in his 1974 article co-authored with Tversky are representativeness, availability, and anchoring. The representative heuristic denotes the proclivity of persons to rely on "stereotypes," as K calls them, rather than chance-guesses or base-rates to make determinations. It is commonly employed to make fast, easy, and coherent decisions or judgments based on limited information and reduce cognitive strain. Although the process (stereotyping) is often frowned upon in contemporary culture, as K explains, "the intuitive impressions that it produces are often—indeed, usually—more accurate than chance guesses would be" (2011, p. 151). The availability heuristic is the inclination to decide the size of a class or likelihood of an event according to the ease whereby similar instances are unconsciously recalled (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 129, 142; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127). Anchoring is the propensity to make baseline predictions from an inadequate sampling or "partial calculation" affiliated with an initial experience. Its effects include future "adjustments" that are usually inadequate and gravitate toward the interpretation of the initial value (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 119-122; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1128). Although commonly witnessed in the fast computations, anchoring expresses both quantitatively and qualitatively, as seen, for example, in the "halo effect" ("suppressed ambiguity"). In this instance a holistic judgment about a person is made based on inordinate weight assigned to a person is determined by inordinate weights assigned to a personally relevant characteristic intended during initial or early contact (i.e., first impression) (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 82-83, 199-200).

But *TFS* does more than just explain the heuristics of judgments and decisions, the common biases they are susceptible to, or the reasons why it is so difficult for persons "to think statistically" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 13). The project is as much about everyday understanding as it is about everyday thinking. Everyday understanding, as K shows in chapters two, three, and four of *TFS*, antecedes everyday thinking and aggregates its basis. It associatively generates the interpretive weights assumed by the heuristics of judgment and decision. It feeds the everyday judging-deciding machine with the *"basic assessments"* it requires to arrive at its determinations quickly and easily (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 89, 105, 130). The association process also, it can be inferred from K's analysis, shapes the questions cognition automatically presents to itself in situations where information about its matter is scarce or tenuous. In the course of everyday living, persons are more likely to ask questions about things that situate their queries within interpretive contexts familiar to them or in relation to things previously experienced then they are to submit themselves to investigating things rigorously.

K subsumes the cognitive operations affiliated with everyday understanding and thinking under the rubric, "System 1," which he also calls "fast thinking" and differentiates from "System 2," or "slow thinking." K rightfully calls System 1 the "hero" of *TFS*, and contends that most of what happens in everyday understanding and thinking originates in it, "but System 2," or deliberate understanding and thinking, "takes over when things get difficult, and it normally has the last word" (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 20, 25). System 1, as K explains it, is an associatively powered narrating and weighting machine that unconsciously effects the everyday interpretation of things. It fluently generates the understanding, judgments, and decisions affiliated with everyday living, "operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control," and "continually constructs a coherent interpretation of what is going on in our world at any instant"(Kahneman, 2011, pp. 13, 20). System 2, in contrast, is the mode of cognition that is "deliberate, effortful, and orderly." It is the source of "complex computations," "concentration," and "reasoning," including "statistical reasoning" and "reasoning about patterns of causation" (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 20, 76, 77), and commonly affiliated with notions of the self: "when we think of ourself," K explains, "we identify with System 2, the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to do" (2011, p. 21).

K does not explicitly affiliate System 1 with common sense, and seems to purposefully avoid relating them. The same goes with mentions of consciousness, which can be counted on less than one hand. He appears to want to circumvent questions about common sense, as well as consciousness, and instead confine *TFS* to explanations of the cognitive mechanics of everyday interpreting. Regardless, the implication is there and resounds throughout his project. The workings and outcomes of System 1, as K explains them, correspond to everyday understanding and thinking. They equate to common sense.

The substance of System 1 processing is "associative activation." K describes System 1 as an "associative machine that represents reality by a complex pattern of links" (2011, p. 77). These links are relations (associations) between the matter of experiencing (messages) and their referents, or (a) prior experiences of analogous or related phenomena or (b) experiences of phenomena encountered contemporaneously. Once "formed," associations are "strengthened" through subsequent activation and then assimilated into the network of as-

sociations constituting associative memory. There they are available to immediate activation and "accessed" unconsciously (Kahneman, 2011, p. 22). K calls associative memory "the core of System 1" (2011, p. 13), and contends it maintains a "detailed model" of the world that routinely guides our "thoughts and actions." The associations it encompasses, upon activation, according to K, produce "a tacit interpretation" of one's situation, connect "the present with the recent past and with expectations about the near future," and effect the day-in-day-out interpretation of reality (2011, p. 13).

Psychologists commonly equate the interpreting correlated to associative activation with "intuition," which, according to K, who quotes Simon, "'is nothing more and nothing less than recognition'" (2011, p. 237; Simon, 1992, p. 155). He then adds: "this strong statement reduces the apparent magic of intuition to the everyday experience of memory" and reveals "the mystery of knowing without knowing is not a distinctive feature of intuition," but, rather, "the norm of mental life" (2011, p. 237). Also "strong" are the connotations the assertion carries, including: the correspondence of (a) everyday understanding and thinking with associative understanding and thinking and (b) associative understanding and thinking with intuitive understanding and thinking.

K correlates the ascendency of associations in everyday interpreting to their (a) reliability, (b) relevancy, (c) symmetry, (d) complexity, and (e) communicability.

a. *Reliability*. Associations usually work, almost all the time, and provide close, or at least close enough, approximations of reality to allow common sense to produce a coherent understanding of things, evoke confidence in its interpretations, and operate unconsciously (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 13, 14, 58, 87, 200).
b. *Relevancy*. The predictability of the environment's associations are correlated to induces their regular activation, and their regular activation reinforces the cognitive links and increases their availability and susceptibility to activation (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 22, 240).
c. *Symmetry*. The correspondences among associations allow them to hang together as a constellation of "connected" and mutually reinforcing links that facilitates their activation (Kahneman, 2011, p. 51). It also enables associations to work together to produce interpretive contexts thereby further strengthening them and their interconnections (Kahneman, 2011, p. 80).
d. *Complexity*. The heterogeneity and multiplicity of associative memories enable System 1 to mitigate divergencies and surprises in its environment, fluently "maintain and update" its understanding of reality, and "automatically and unconsciously" intend it as "normal" (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 70-78, 416). It also allows associations to generate intelligible contexts when none are given (Kahneman, 2011, p. 81).
e. *Communicability*. The interpretations associations generate are communicable and, hence, intersubjectively endorsed when they are shared through "words" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 74).

These variables, the ones that determine the preeminence of associations in everyday interpreting, distinguish System 1 as a self-recapitulating, self-reinforcing, and self-updating world narrating machine; they sometimes also, as latter remarks indicate, distinguish it as a self-defeating one. They enable associations to produce automatic interpretations of phenomena that are characterized by their confidence, coherence, and cognitive ease. Ensuing from these outcomes, from the largely seamless, reliable, and fluent interpretations of the world associations effect, is a sense of freedom, predictability, well-being, and normalcy (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 51, 70). The entire process works something like this: (a) the reliability, relevancy, symmetry, complexity, and communicability of associations boost the cohesiveness of everyday understanding and thinking, (b) the cohesiveness of everyday understanding and thinking "induces" its "cognitive ease," and (c) together cohesiveness and cognitive ease generate feelings of familiarity, truthfulness, goodness, and effortlessness (Kahneman, 2011, p. 66), which, in turn, (d) evoke confidence and allow System 1 to operate unconsciously. The impulse driving the entire process is the human need for interpretability, its predisposition toward cognitive economy, and the laziness of System 2 (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 31, 35, 75-76, 367) – "a general 'law of least effort' applies to cognitive as well as physical exertion" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 35).

K corresponds the outcome of System 1 processing with WYSIATI, or "what you see is all there is" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 85). System 1 produces a relatively intelligible understanding of reality that is based on "fragments" of information and usually ignores inconsistencies and ambiguities in the information it intends (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 35, 71-78). Indeed, as explained by K, the "amount" and "quality" of the data available to System 1 are "irrelevant" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 85); it is the "consistency" rather than the "completeness" of the information processed "that matters for a good story;" and "knowing little" usually makes it easier for System 1 to frame things intelligibly, generate narratives it accepts as true, and effect interpretations close enough to reality "to support reasonable action" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 87).

2. The Phenomenon of Typification

S (Schutz) led the 20th century introduction of phenomenology into the social sciences and is an important phenomenological thinker in his own right. Noteworthy admirers of his work include Aaron Gurwitsch, Maurice Natanson, Herbert Spiegelberg, Richard Zaner, and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who appropriated his thinking as the theoretical basis of their seminal text, *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967).

S came to phenomenology, specifically, the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, by way of his study of Max Weber's interpretation of subjective meaning and the debate within the social sciences concerning the rendition of *Verstehen* (Schutz, 1954; Spiegelberg, 1982, pp. 255-256; Walsh, 1967). From there he developed his phenomenology of the life-world of the natural attitude (henceforth, just "life-world"), or, as he formally named it, "a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude" (Schutz, 1962a, p. 149; Zaner, 1961).

The life-world is not "a world," as Merleau-Ponty observes, but, rather, "the world," or the world that is "always '*already t/here*' before reflection begins" (1962, p. xviii). It is the immanently intersubjective (shared) world that is given straightforwardly to (factically undergone by) the "wide-awake" (everyday) person in daily life (Schutz, 1945, pp. 545, 549; 1955); one of "eminently practical interest" that obliges its "domination" (Schutz, 1945, p. 534); and the singular reality persons endure among and alongside each other within the primeval "is-ness" of their togetherness. The life-world is none other than "paramount reality" (Schutz, 1945, 569; 1962a, p. 148), and the natural attitude (general thesis) is the prereflective (unconscious) certainty in its epistemological validity (Schutz, 1944a, p. 80). It is consciousness as such (intentionality, transcendence), and, as discerned by S, synonymous with the "world of daily life" and "common-sense world" (Schutz, 1955, p. 143). It is the world as it is typically experienced, typically understood, and typically articulated. The life-world is the ongoing typical constitution of things and the singular world the everyday person undergoes (comes to pass as, transcends to) in the course of daily life and primordially shares with "others."

The phenomenon of constitution, thought transcendental-phenomenologically (and by S), does not mean genesis in the contemporary sense, nor does it mean creation, birth, fabrication, or invention, and, hence, should not be confused with imagination or fantasy, although these too are typically constituted. Constitution, as Ricoeur notes, is not "constructing, even less creating," but also not quite, as he describes it, "the unfolding of the intendings of consciousness which are merged together in the natural, unreflective, naïve grasp of a thing" (1967, p. 9), an understanding that resonates with solipsistic undertones. Nor can its facticity be reduced to a "product of the dialect" between the "real" and "subjectivity," as Sokolowski proposes and which refracts the same connotations (Sokolowski, 1970, p. 219). Constitution is the singular coming-to-pass of consciousness gathering within/unto/as itself the meaning of things as it means them and they are meant from themselves, or νόησίς ἐστιν ὅτι νοεῖται (*nóēsis estin óti noeītai*). It is synonymous with consciousness itself (the life-world), akin to the pre-philosophical λόγος (*lógos*), inclusive of its correspondence with the equally primeval ποιεῖν (*poieîn*), ἀλήθεια (*alétheia*), and φύσις (*phúsis*), and, also, like λόγος, includes language (λέγειν) (*légein*) (Maly, 1986; Richardson, 1967, pp. 261-262, 268-269, 282-283, 491-493). Constitution is originary interpreting and the experiencing-of-the-world; it is the experiencing-of-the-t/here. Its phenomenological exposition reveals the ownmost (*Wesen*) of consciousness to be the meaning of its matter as it is noetically and noematically endured.

The inceptual step S takes deconstructing the constitution of the life-world, one that he appropriates from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, is the phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological reduction, or ἐποχή (*epokhḗ*, also commonly transliterated, although, less accurately, as *epoché*), is the endeavor to arrive at a lucid comprehension of phenomena by halting cognitive participation in their meaning and letting their ownmost (*Wesen*) overtake comprehension. The reduction labors to suspend prepredications and predications, including theoretical, empirical, ideological, and personal ones, that could alienate the interpreter from the way phenomena are factically shown from themselves, from their truth pre-philosophically understood as ἀλήθεια (*alétheia*) inclusive of the dissonance (ambiguity, dissent) connoted by the relation between the term's α-privativum and verbal stem, λήθω (*lítho*) (nothingness, also forgottenness); ἀλήθεια is the primeval antecedent of the transcendental-phenomenological interpretation of essence as ἀπόφανσις (*apófansis*) (i.e., "apodictic evidence"). The reduction is ingredient to the transcendental-phenomenological effort to let things as they are shown from themselves seize interpreting and resist drifting into dualistic (Cartesian) interpretations of reality that posit the world as a discrete object populated by discrete (objectified) subjects and objects.

The life-world rendered in the reduced sphere is revealed to be constituted largely by typifications, according to S. It is shown from itself essentially as an unfolding process (happening) of typifying and a totality of typical knowledge and experiencing. Typifications, which S also calls "common-sense constructs" (1954, p. 267) and "the constructs of common-sense thinking of everyday life" (1953a, p. 18), are generic, public, open-ended, and pragmatically motivated meanings that constitute the way things are, have been, and should be (1950; 1955, p. 145). They are taken-for-granted, operate smoothly, quickly, and effortlessly, intersubjectively understood, and "to a considerable extent socially derived and socially approved" (Schutz, 1953a, p. 14; 1955, p. 193). Typifications are *graduated knowledge* (Schutz, 1944b, p. 500). They are reliable and habitual meanings whose veracity is automatically assumed as long as the anticipations they project are fulfilled; typifications are appresentations (apperceptions) whose sway in intentionality is correlated to their predictive reliability. All things intended (experienced), including persons, objects, social and communicative contexts, relations, causal or otherwise, the past, present, and future, ways of life, the Divine, and whatever means toward achieving whatever ends in whatever situations are in one way or another typically constituted, although also always in different ways biographically understood, according

to S (1951, 1953a). Typifications speak to a life-world of immanently pragmatic rather than "theoretical" interests (Schutz, 1945, p. 534), interpret phenomena in "unquestioned pre-experienced" terms (Schutz, 1953a, p. 5), and define the human encounter with the "total horizon of all possible experiences" (Schutz, 1966b, p. 94). They govern everyday thinking, which S describes as interpreting that includes a typically formulated project, means-end relation, or motive, of both *"in-order-to"* and *"because"* types, and equates with "common-sense thinking" (1951, 1953a).

Typifications dominate the constitution of meaning in consciousness and language, where they are either already activated or idling within the stock of knowledge at hand ready for activation. The stock of knowledge is a matrix of referentially connected types, constitutes a "horizon of familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship," and is "taken-for-granted until further notice as the unquestioned, though at any time questionable" appresentation of things (Schutz, 1953a, p. 5). The activation of the meanings it embodies is contingent on the intention of phenomena analogous or related to the *"typical* pre-familiarity" they project (embody) (Schutz, 1966b, p. 94). Everyday language, the vernacular, is a "treasure house of preconstitued types," S observes (1950, p. 393), and the "typifying medium *par excellence*" through which knowledge of the world is forged, recapitulated, and shared (Schutz, 1953a, pp. 9-10). When a person names a phenomenon he implicitly relates "it by its typicality to preexperienced things of similar typical structure" and simultaneously accepts "it's open horizon referring to future experiences of the same type, which are therefore capable of being given the same name" (Schutz, 1950, p. 393). The sway of typifications in consciousness and language speaks to their mutual intimacy and simultaneity. Consciousness and language are not separate phenomena. They are of each other, and together distinguish the life-world as an "infinite open horizon" of typical "anticipated possibilities of further determination" (Schutz, 1966b, p. 94).

S describes the general features of typifications. He also elucidates their operation in consciousness, language, and the social world. He does not point blank reduce them to their incipience, however, and the furthest he straightforwardly goes originating their genesis is asserting they are socially generated and distributed. The project is outside of his stated scope, which is the phenomenological deconstruction of the life-world of the natural attitude (also, the "social world"), and one that, as Gurwitsch remarks, "deliberately abstains from raising questions of transcendental constitution" (1966, p. xv). But several of S's published writings (1950, 1953b, 1955, 1966b) indicate he was more than just aware of the matter "as a possible line of research" (Gurwitsch, 1966, p. xiv). They also suggest that notions of transcendental constitution, specifically Husserl's, were implicit to his understanding of typifications.

S, following Eugene Fink, contends that Husserl's studies of typifications are more "operative" than they are "thematic" and, as a consequence, "highly equivocal" and "in need of further clarification" (1966b, p. 92). The assertion is not incorrect, but it is also partial. Phenomenology is a project underway. It is "a problem to be solved and a hope to be realized," and immanently destined to remain at an "initial stage" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. viii). Its theses and observations, hence, are always operative as well as propositional. But "operative" does not mean free-floating, random, or directionless. "Operative" indicates an understanding dictated by its matter. It suggests an attunement enabled and impelled, perhaps even enowned (*er-eignet*), by the to-be-thought. The to-be-thought of phenomenological thinking is its thematic content. The same goes with the investigation of the phenomenon of typification, and although Schutz states that Husserl's later writings, specifically, *Erfahrung und Urteil* (*Experience and Judgment*) (1997), *Cartesian Meditations* (1960), and *Krisis* (*Crisis*) (1970) do not arrive at a theme does not mean there is none or there should be one. It only means Husserl did not yield a theme S assessed was sufficiently "clarified" to promote progress (1966a, p. 93). But the purpose of phenomenology is not to establish themes, and it is incumbent on students of its thinking to avoid reifying ones laid out in waters, such as those of transcendental constitution, that are muddy. Seen in Husserl's studies of typification are less reflections that remain "operatively adumbrated," as S contends (1966a, p. 93), and more efforts to exhibit distinct dimensions of the phenomenon and the struggle affiliated with generating a lexicon to exhibit them.

But S's critical analysis of Husserl's writings does significantly more than identify shortcomings in efforts to elucidate the transcendental constitution of typifications. It explicitly implies an exposition of their constitution. In his important essay, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," S writes:

> *Erfahrung und Urteil* [*Experience and Judgment*] connects the notion of typicality with a set of other operative notions which never become thematic for a philosophical analysis and are equivocal in respect of their relation both to one another and to the notion of typicality. These are concepts of "similarity," "synthesis by congruence," "association," "impressive aspects," "interest." Is it Husserl's view that typicality is founded upon the preconstitution of similarity by association? Or have we to assume that similarity itself presupposes an experience of typicality, namely, that of the typically similar? And what is typically similar? The "impressive" aspect of the actually perceived object. What makes this aspect impressive? Our prevailing interest in the broader or narrower sense. Moreover, what sets the passive synthesis of congruence going by which the actually apperceived object is paired with a recollected element that is just a latent habitual possession "called forth" as a similar or dissimilar one? Is it indeed the same passive synthesis of congruence which creates by apperceptive transference a set of anticipations that attach

themselves to the givenness of a newly encountered objectivity of the same type, and thus brings about the character of pre-acquaintedness and familiarity of our experiencing of the life-world of the natural attitude? (1966, p. 111-112).

From the answers S suggests in his questioning of Husserl, especially against some of his other studies of typifications, the following can be propositionally deduced: *typifications are associatively evoked appresentations (apperceptions) whose constitution ensues from the association of at least three intended (experienced) and personally relevant phenomena whose meanings are analogous (or related).* Prior to the intention of the second phenomenon, the meaning of the first, and if itself was not already the product of typifying, is interpreted as unique, although in one way or another also typically and biographically understood. Moreover, although the meaning of the first intended phenomenon contributes to the interpretation of the second, it does so largely comparatively rather than typically notwithstanding that different orders of typifications are always in play. It is only after the intention of a third phenomenon that is analogous or related to the second one that the typification is constituted. The correspondences between the comparatively constituted meaning of the second phenomena and the third intended analogous phenomenon produce a type through an unconscious process Husserl describes as "a passive synthesis" of "pairing," "coupling," or "association" (Schutz, 1966b, p. 112).

This passive synthesis of association (pairing, coupling), it can be inferred from S's analysis of Husserl, and continuous with other of S's related writings—including "Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Volume II," where he states, "*association and apperception are principles of the typification of all psychological acts*" (emphasis mine) (1953, p. 408), and "Symbol, Reality and Society," where he asserts that "*the most primitive case of a coupling or pairing association is characterized by the fact that two or more data are intuitively given in the unity of consciousness, which, by this very reason, constitutes two distinct phenomena as a unity, regardless of whether or not they are attended to*" (emphasis also mine) (1955, pp. 143-144)—is the same process whereby meanings are typically constituted generally. Also inferable from S's analysis is the possibility of reducing the transformation to three moments: (a) activation, (b) assimilation, and (c) reinforcement, reformulation, or formulation.

   a. *Activation*: Typifications are wakened, called forth, or evoked (activated) in experiencing when consciousness intends phenomena whose "impressive" characteristics corresponding to one's "prevailing" interest (Schutz, 1966b, p. 112) are analogous or related to types already activated in consciousness or idling within the stock of knowledge at hand (as well as language) ready to be associatively activated (Schutz, 1953a, p. 5; 1955, p. 145).
   b. *Assimilation*: A reduction of S's rendition of Husserl's theses about transcendental constitution suggests the meanings affiliated with activated typifications are not "apperceptively transferred" to an intended phenomenon as "vacillating" approximations (Schutz, 1966b, p. 111), but, rather, assimilated by the intention of the phenomenon. The transcending movedness most own (*das Eigenste*) to consciousness suggests the noematic content of intentionality triggers the typical constitution of meaning more so than its noetic content does.
   c. *Reinforcement, reformulation, or formulation*: Consistencies between the intended phenomenon and its appresentation reinforce the typifications activated in its interpretation. If differences between the intended phenomenon and appresentation are endured that do not contradict or overturn their symmetry, then the activated typifications will evolve to accommodate the variances and develop into extended iterations of the original types. If the intended phenomenon proves too unique or contradicts the activated typifications and there are no types available that are consistent with its meaning, then a distinct set of typifications are put into play to mitigate the disturbance or the constitution of a new type is incited (Schutz, 1950, 1953a; 1955, pp. 145-147; 1966a).

The phenomenon of typification governs the constitution of the life-world. The prevalence of typifications in consciousness and language, conjoined processes whose mutual intimacy S tends to neglect in his writings, distinguishes the life-world as the "common-sense world" (Gurwitsch, 1966; Natanson, 1962). Their general correspondence with factual evidence is usual and relevant, but not paramount. The taken-for-grantedness of typifications correlates to their reliability, practicality, and commonality. It is positively related to their recapitulation in everyday language and their ability to anticipate things, continue fulfilling expectations after current ones are confirmed, and support or accommodate the generation of new appresentations (Schutz, 1955, p. 145). It is also continuous with the natural attitude. The epistemological certitude in the life-world runs through the typifications of daily life (Schutz, 1966b, p. 94). The meanings only need to fulfill basic requirements to preserve it. This epistemological slack, the fact that typifications only need to prove themselves to be sufficiently consistent and reliable to maintain their "accent of reality," (Schutz, 1955, p. 189), does not mean the typical constitution of meaning proscribes everyday persons from grasping "the reality of the world." It only means it enables them to grasp relevant aspects of it sufficiently to conduct the "business of living" (Schutz, 1953a, pp. 2-3).

3. Comparative Analysis

Notwithstanding their different approaches, one explicative, the other descriptive, both empirical, K and S's renditions of common sense are remarkably analogous. They both equate common sense to everyday understanding and thinking, reveal it as associative interpreting, reduce it to corresponding elements, and provide comparable depictions of the phenomenon. K speaks of System 1 as "System 1 thinking," but in actuality his empirical targets are everyday understanding and thinking, which together are synonymous with common sense. He also equates everyday understanding with intuition, intuition with recognition, and recognition with association. Everyday understanding, as he explains it, is a passively constructed interpreting process fashioned by the association of comparable or related phenomena or phenomena experienced concurrently. Associations are located in associative memory, where they are unconsciously activated when things referentially corresponding to them are experienced. Once on line they operate automatically and invisibly in consciousness as "typical exemplars" for comprehending (Kahneman, 2011, p. 93).

Everyday thinking, as explained by K, is intuitive or associative thinking (2011, pp. 8, 13, 86, 98, 416). It is interpreting that contains associatively (heuristically) derived judgments or decisions, as well as processes of substitution, or the unconscious process of asking and answering associatively generated questions that are easier to ask and answer than the ones requisite to factual understanding (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 13, 51, 77, 310). Whereas everyday understanding is more or less a passive process of association that is *evoked* throughout the course of routine and unproblematic living, everyday thinking is an active process of association that is *invoked* when a person encounters situations that compel him to judge, decide, or choose matters affiliated with a course of action (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 415-416). Both processes occur unconsciously and embody activated associations, but the latter kicks in when a person faces an exigency, opportunity, or possibility that compels a cognitive initiative or response. Everyday thinking "operates as a machine for jumping to conclusions" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 85), which K says is "efficient if the conclusions are likely to be correct," "the costs of an occasional mistake acceptable," and "if the jump saves much time and effort," which are usually the case (2011, p. 74). Like its counterpart, it is smooth, fast, effortless, and liberates the individual to attend to the business of life – "a person cannot live normally while constantly reporting her experiences" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 392). Its ascendency in cognition corresponds to the confidences it evokes, which is correlated to the coherence of its weights, the fluency of its weighting, and its ability to support other "reasonable action" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 87).

S provides a comparable understanding of common sense. He equates common sense to intuition, intuition to typification (appresentation, apperception), and typification to association (Schutz, 1955, p. 145). Everyday understanding, as he elucidates it, is typical understanding. It comprises appresentations passively formulated from associations of similar or related experiences. Everyday thinking is everyday understanding that includes a calculus commonly articulated as a project, means-ends relation, or motive. The invisibility, fluency, and ascendency of typifications in everyday understanding and thinking correlate to their open-endedness, practicality, reliability, and sharedness as well as their situatedness within the natural attitude. Their sway within intentionality distinguishes everyday experiencing as typical experiencing and the life-world as the typical or common-sense world. The phenomenon of typification does not nullify the "individual characteristics" of intended phenomena, but instead frees subjectivity to gloss over differences that are irrelevant to its immediate interests and would unnecessarily complicate concrete living (Schutz, 1953a, p. 5). Typifications continually evolve through their recapitulation, reformulation, or nullification – "confirmation of types in current experiences strengthens the appresentations while differences between anticipated and encountered phenomena either falsify the meanings or provoke their adaptation" (Schutz, 1966b, p. 96). S locates inactivated typifications within the stock of knowledge at hand and language where he asserts, they idle ready to be activated when phenomena related to them are intended, and upon activation "'start rising'" automatically in consciousness (Schutz, 1955).

K and S's perspectives are analogous, but not equivalent, however, and their divergences in no small way correlate to their distinct points of departure. K's affiliation of everyday understanding and thinking with System 1 and his reduction of System 1 to the activation of associations in associative memory imply a mechanistic conception of human being. The theses suggest an objectification of the human person, an encapsulation of understanding and thinking in the brain, and a correspondence of common sense to the production, activation, and maintenance of cognitive links. K's signifies an informational interpretation of common sense that lays out its cognitive operations as relations between messages and referents, and largely overlooks the way the meanings are constituted or experienced in consciousness. For K, the human person has an interpretation of the world. He does not transcend to (comes to pass as, endure) the world as he interprets it. Also, except for a brief mention of the communicability of associations, K neglects the role of language in System 1 processing. This omission, the failure to address the relation between language and consciousness and the role of language shaping the comprehension of reality, also suggests a dualistic interpretation of human reality. It speaks to an appropriation of the human person as an object (subject) standing over against others objects located in a world also intended as an object.

S exhibits everyday understanding and thinking against the phenomenological interpretation of human

being as life-world. For S, human being is its everyday understanding and thinking of things. It is the phenomenon of common sense, or the typical constitution of meaning, an automatic and unconscious process that is perpetually in flux, immanently intersubjective, and coupled to the pragmatic exigencies of everyday life. The life-world, as S discerns it, is the common-sense world. It is an event whose meaning is constituted by a "stock" of socially and biographically defined experiences and unfurls as the "horizon" of "unquestioned, though at any time questionable…pre-experiences" that from their outset are also "*typical* ones" (Schutz, 1953a, pp. 5-6).

S's rendition of everyday understanding and thinking, which is purported to be as they are directly endured, yields a robust understanding of the phenomena, but, like K's, contains weaknesses relative to its starting-point. One of its chief shortfalls is a lack of psychological specificity requisite to a more operational understanding of common sense. S exhibits common sense as a meaning constituting process, but does not delve as far as K does exposing its emotive and cognitive determinants. Whereas S affiliates the sway of typifications in consciousness with their commonality, reliability, fluency, taken-for-grantedness, and social genesis, as well as their occurrence withing the natural attitude, K affiliates the ascendency of System 1 to the more definitive variables of coherence, confidence, and cognitive ease; the positive feelings affiliated with its narratives about reality; the fundamental human need for interpretability; the laziness of System 2; and "our almost unlimited ability to ignore our ignorance" (2011, p. 201). System 1, which K sources to human evolution (2011, pp. 21-22, 67, 76, 90, 115), generates an understanding of the world that is "more tidy, simple, predictable, and coherent than it really is," effects illusions of understanding the past and predicting and controlling the future that are "comforting," and reduces the anxiety that would otherwise be experienced if one confronted the "uncertainties of existence" (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 204-205). It is the consistency of the information that counts, and not its quantity or "completeness," K contends, and System 1 more easily frames phenomena into a "coherent story" with minimal data (Kahneman, 2011, p. 87). For System 1, WYSIATI, or "what you see is all there is," is reality, and unless it decides immediately to reject evidence, it will automatically process the information "as if it were true" (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 153, 201, 212).

S does not deliver this level of detail in his analysis. He does not deconstruct everyday thinking into its differential constituents, at least not to the degree K does. His arc centers on the elucidation of the life-world as it is endured by everyday person in:

> a *general thesis* as meaningfully valid for him with all that he finds in it, with all natural things, with all living beings (especially human beings), and with meaningful products of all sorts (tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, etc.). Hence, the naïvely living person (we are speaking of healthy, grown-up and wide-awake human beings) automatically has in hand, so to speak, the meaningful complexes which are valid for him. From things inherited and learned, from the manifold sedimentations of tradition, habituality, and his own previous constitutions of meaning, which can be retained and reactivated, his *store of experience* of his life-world is built up as closed meaningful complex. This complex is normally unproblematical for him, and it remains controllable by him in such a way that his momentary interest selects from his store of experience those things which are relevant to the demand of the situation (Schutz, 1962b, pp. 135-136).

The discernment of systematic bias and the duration of common sense K and S examine further separate their analyses of *Verstehen*. Whereas K exposes the first variable, S at best only implies it. K convincingly explains the susceptibility of the heuristics of everyday decisions, choices, and judgments to error. The biases he says they routinely fall victim to and undermine the ability of common sense to produce reliable interpretations of reality include: (a) "overconfidence," or the tendency of persons to commit themselves to their narratives regardless the quantity or quality of data they encounter (2011, pp. 14, 87-88, 194); (b) "framing," or the ability of suggestions to divert everyday interpreting from understanding, judging, or deciding things on their own merits (2011, pp. 88, 367); and (c) "base-rate neglect," which is the unconscious tendency to forgo the data requisite to factual determinations and instead rely on the information given with a situation regardless its amplitude or dubiousness (2011, pp. 88, 151). Other heuristic biases described by K include:

- *affect*: consulting emotions rather than empirical data to judge or decide phenomenon (2011, pp. 103, 140);
- *conjunction*: transposing assessments about one thing to another thing that is experienced contemporaneously (2011, pp. 158, 164);
- *repetition*: correlating the veracity of a phenomenon to the frequency of exposure to it (2011, pp. 62, 66);
- *availability*: correlating confidence in judgments and decisions to the fluency of their formulation or the ease of similar instances coming to mind (2011, pp. 129, 130, 131);
- *anchoring*, and its derivative, *the halo effect*: making global judgments about something or someone that are correlated to an initial experience of personally relevant characteristics rather than to empirically motivated determinations (2011, pp. 119-120, 199-200, 310), and;
- *planning*, or *delusional optimism*: selectively affirming variables affiliated with a course of action to validate it (2011, pp. 251-255).

Perhaps the farthest S goes discerning the propensity of common sense to bias, beyond corresponding "everyday knowledge" to a "likelihood" rather than a "certainty" or "probability in the mathematical sense" (1943, p. 98), is found in his description of the meaning disturbances he asserts a stranger to a social world suffers when he endeavors to understand and navigate the "'cultural pattern of group life'" (1944b, pp. 499-500). The encounter, as described by S, reveals three shortages endemic to typifications. One, typifications do not constitute an organized system; two, they only possess *sufficient* coherence, clarity, and consistency" to allow persons "a reasonable chance of understanding and of being understood," and; three, they are not consistent from one typification to another (1944b, pp. 500-501). Other considerations of the susceptibility of common sense to systematic error are largely absent in S's work.

K and S also attend to distinct intervals of everyday interpreting. K concentrates on exposing the interaction of activated associations in *durée*, or immediate experiencing. Evincing this arc are his theses that "an essential design feature of the associative machine is that it represents only activated ideas;" "information that is not retrieved (even unconsciously) from memory might as well not exist," and "System 1 excels at constructing the best possible story that incorporates ideas currently activated, but it does not (cannot) allow for information it does not have" (2011, p. 85). Further suggestive of K's concentration is his attention to the ability of associations to be formulated referentially as well as analogically. The variable emphasized here is the interval of experiencing. The capacity of referents to determine the meaning of a message sometimes has less to do with the significance they embody (project), semiological or otherwise, and more to do with their experiential proximity, that is, to whether they are intended concurrently or within a short period. Although referents affiliated with associations usually consist of types, and typifying, which K calls "stereotyping," shapes everyday understanding and thinking, and neglecting "valid" ones often results in "suboptimal judgments" (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 168-169), they sometimes correspond to phenomena that contain nothing relevant to a message other than they are experienced more or less simultaneously. This is the case with the priming heuristic, or the ability of "unconscious stimuli" that "fluctuate from moment to moment" to influence intuitive thinking. For example, "the brief pleasure of a cool breeze on a hot day" tends to evoke more positive or optimistic determinations than would otherwise be motivated. For example, "the brief pleasure of a cool breeze on a hot day" tends to incline persons to evaluate things more positively or optimistically (Kahneman, 2011, p. 225).

Other cognitive biases showcased by K in support of theses redolent of his focus are correlated to the exposure and conjunction heuristics. According to K, psychological experiments have consistently shown that persons are likely to believe true the assertion, "'the body temperature of a chicken is 144°,'" if they are first repeatedly exposed to the phrase, "'the body temperature of a chicken.'" As K explains it, the "familiarity" generated by the initial redundancy suffices "to make the whole statement feel familiar, and therefore true" (2011, 62). Now, the assertions are indeed to some extent analogically related. They contain foliations of corresponding typifications, including notions of temperature, animals, and chickens, that embody the same meanings. But the idea of 144° is not one of them, although the understanding of temperature is associatively generated, nor does the number fall within the "normal" (typical) amplitude of body temperatures for any animal, including chickens. The referent is contrived, not meaningfully related to the message, "the body temperature of a chicken," and determinations of its veracity correlated to a repeated exposure to the first phrase and the conjunction implied by the situatedness of the second.

When S speaks of references he indicates them as meaning objects, and almost always as typical ones meaningfully connected to (continuous with) a communicative or social context (Schutz, 1950, 1955). Moreover, S does not exclude the ability of any typification to influence common sense regardless its accessibility. For S, "no apperception is merely instantaneous and transient," and "any apperception becomes part of habitual knowledge as a permanent result" (1966b, p. 96). S also concentrates more on exhibiting the longitudinal rather than lateral constitution of experiencing. His exposition of the phenomenon of typification in *durée*, as instanced in his discussions of "*in-order-to*" and "*because*" motives, is part of a longer arc discerning the holistic constitution of consciousness. One reason for S's broader focus could be his aversion to analyses of transcendental genesis. Another could be his attention to the social production and distribution of knowledge. There is also the question of perspective. K's postulates are sourced to findings from experimental psychology, a method whose theses tend to be suited to studies of short intervals of experience, while S relies on direct interpretation, which tends to investigate phenomena less as discrete intentional acts and explore them more as constituent elements of the life-world.

Conclusion

The matter of K and S's thinking is common sense. It is everyday understanding and thinking, or *Verstehen*. K and S exhibit everyday understanding and thinking as associative understanding and thinking. They describe the first phenomenon as more or less passive associative interpreting and the second as associative interpreting that includes an associatively derived calculus, which K equates to heuristics and S coincides with projects, motives, or mean-end relations. The differences between their renditions of common sense correspond generally to their distinct points of departure, K's objectivistic and explicative and S's phenomenological and descriptive. K intends the human person as a subject standing over against other subjects and objects. His perspective is essentially dualistic (Cartesian). S intends the human person as subjectivity,

or a world, one that is primordially shared and comes to pass: the life-world. His perspective is essentially holistic (phenomenological). For K, the individual possesses common sense, which, as explained by K under the rubric of "System 1 thinking," produces narratives about reality. For S, the individual *is* the phenomenon of common sense, which he corresponds with the phenomenon of typification and the life-world, or reality as such. The differences between K and S's perspectives do not imply their mutual exclusion, however. They do not proscribe their availability to joint analyses of *Verstehen*. Instead, they speak to their complementarity. They suggest the possibility of together providing a more comprehensive understanding of common sense than either could give independently.

K goes further empirically in his analysis by backing his claims with evidence from the experimental-psychological investigation of everyday understanding and thinking: "the mechanism that causes these mental events," as K remarks, "has been known for a long time: it is the association of ideas" (2011, pp. 11, 51), a process, he adds, that "has been shaped by evolution to provide a continuous assessment of the main problems that an organism must solve to survive" (2011, p. 90). His study also yields greater specificity, concentrates more on the inception and operation of common sense in *durée*, and provides a robust understanding of its susceptibility to systematic bias. But these dividends invoke costs. K's adherence to an informational rendition of common sense, one that defines associations as cognitive links or relations between messages and referents rather than intending them as meanings, particularly typical ones inclusive of the characteristics elucidated by S, may indeed provide a more exact and falsifiable interpretation of common sense, but also dehumanizes the phenomenon (as well as the individual) and dissociates it from a total conception of the human person.

S's rendition of common sense could be characterized as sometimes leaning too far the other way. It is abundant in human significance, succeeds in discerning the way common sense is structured, operates, and unfurls as the world of daily life, but lacks the specificity K derives from his objectivistic treatment of the phenomenon. It is also less available to operationalization (and falsification). For example, the psychology of heuristics is more suited to professional, management, and organizational development and studies of the common-sense views of consumers and electorates than S's hermeneutics are. One reason for the shortage of precision in S's work relative to K's could be connected to his reluctance to engage in analyses of transcendental constitution. Although S includes in his exposition of the life-world theses implied by his interrogation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology of appresentations (typifications), he largely avoids explicitly incorporating into his analysis the propositional insights it yields, and instead concentrates more on exposing the relation between typifications and social knowledge. The omission is unfortunate. The theses supplied by Husserl's studies of appresentations are consistent with K's rendition of common sense as an associative machine and would likely augment the empirical firepower of S's work. What S does deliver, however, more so than K, is an expansive exposition of everyday interpreting, a holistic understanding of common sense, and a rendition of the phenomenon that endeavors to free itself of dualistic biases that ultimately impede progress, as witnessed, for example, in K's apparent indifference to the meaning dimensions of associations, his assumption of a perspective that locates (encapsulates) experiencing within an objectified subject, and his neglect of the relation of language to the associative machine.

The analysis of K and S's work suggests the potential value of a collaborative application of their perspectives. It suggests the possibility of reciprocally capitalizing on their respective strengths to offset their respective weakness and thereby provide a more complete rendition of common sense. It also connotes the empirical dividends that might be derived from a cross fertilization of the psychological and phenomenological sciences. K's analysis stands to enhance the clarity of its theses by explicitly affiliating System 1 with common sense. The implication is there, strong, and would likely broaden the focus of his research and situate it within a perspective that is more readily understood without diluting the specificity of its assertions. Considerations of the relation of System 1 to consciousness and the individual discerned as a total human person might also help deepen his remarkably telling depiction of everyday understanding and thinking as an associative machine. Perhaps it might also incite thinking the relation of associations to meanings and thereby contribute to progress; the question of this relation, of meaningfully translating associations to meanings, is the principal issue challenging the development of general AI and the replication of common sense in machines. Conversely, S's analysis would undoubtedly benefit by attending to the psychological exposition of systematic error and bias in everyday understanding and thinking. His rendition of common sense is woefully incomplete without it. Even if confined to suppositions given the hermeneutical constraints of the reduction, an earnest treatment of bias and error would likely help align S's perspective with the psychology of heuristics and perhaps enhance the disclosing-saying power of his phenomenology.

Some students of the phenomenological movement might suffer heartburn over the suggestion to introduce theses from other sciences, such as psychology, into phenomenological analysis. The argument contending the reduction proscribes the possibility is not uncommon. The notion is not even wrong, however, and motivations affiliated with it are one of the principal factors that have alienated phenomenology from other lines of empirical research. Science, regardless the method, is the endeavor to interpret things rigorously, and there are no empirically defensible reasons to exclude the findings of other sciences in phenomenological research. Indeed, if anything, studies of corresponding conclusions derived independently in other fields engender possibilities of extending the range of phenomenological research, increase opportunities to test

its theses, and enhance the practical relevance and transdisciplinary significance of its work. S implies his agreement with this proposition when he asserts: to "each empirical determination" within the "mundane" sphere "there necessarily corresponds a feature within" the reduced one (1944a, 83); "all analyses carried out in phenomenological reduction must retain their validation in the correlates of the phenomena investigated within the natural sphere" (1962b, 139), and:

> it is always a remarkable event in the evolution of scientific thought if certain essential ideas developed in one field are corroborated by the results of research in quite another discipline, especially if the investigations are carried out independently of one another, for different purposes, on different levels, and by entirely different methods (1950, p. 365).

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