



THE PSYCHIC SUBJECT AND THE SPIRITUAL SUBJECT IN HUSSERL'S IDEAS II

O sujeito anímico e o sujeito espiritual em Ideias II de Husserl

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El sujeto anímico y el sujeto espiritual en Ideas II de Husserl

Abstract: In this article I intend to highlight how the relationship between the psychic ego (seelischen Ich) and the spiritual ego (geistige Ich) is fundamental to the understanding of intersubjectivity and the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). In Ideas II, Husserl explains how, from the ego, natural, psychic and spiritual objectivities are constituted. These three strata of objectivity are known, first, in the theoretical attitude and, second, in the spiritual attitude. In this process, the ego becomes explicit. In the theoretical attitude, the constitution of nature takes place, for which the body (Körper/Leib) is fundamental. This is followed by the constitution of objects of psychic nature, human or animal (tierisch), including self-perception. In assuming the spiritual attitude, the other is perceived (Urpräsenz) initially as a body together with things, and alongside this perception there is an apprehension (Appräsenz) of co-given horizons. There is an identity between the body of others and mine; it is the moment of empathy (Einfühlung). The scientific world constituted in the theoretical attitude is a reduction of the surrounding world (Umwelt) – the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). This lifeworld is the world of spiritual attitude and precedes any comprehension or explanation of the world. It is therefore through the spiritual attitude that a community of spiritual subjects is constituted and constitutes the lifeworld.

Keywords: Husserl, Psyche, Spirit, Intersubjectivity, Lifeworld.

Resumo: Neste artigo pretendo evidenciar como a relação entre sujeito psíquico (seelischen Ich) e sujeito espiritual (geistige Ich) é fundamental para a compreensão da intersubjetividade e do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt). Em Ideias II, Husserl explica como, a partir do eu, as objetividades naturais, psíquicas e espirituais são constituídas. Estes três estratos de objetividades são conhecidos a partir da atitude teórica e da atitude espiritual. Neste processo, se dá a explicitação do eu. Numa atitude teórica, temos constituição da natureza, para o que o corpo (Körper/Leib) é fundamental. Em seguida, a constituição dos seres de natureza psíquica, humana ou animal, incluindo a autopercepção. Assumindo a atitude espiritual, o outro é percebido (Urpräsenz), inicialmente, como corpo junto às coisas e, ao lado desta percepção, há uma apreensão (Appräsenz) dos horizontes co-dados. Há uma identidade entre o corpo alheio e o meu, é o momento da empatia (Einfühlung). O mundo científico é constituído a partir de uma atitude teórica sendo uma redução do mundo circundante (Umwelt), mais tarde denominado mundo da vida (Lebenswelt). Este mundo da vida é o mundo da atitude espiritual e precede qualquer compreensão ou explicação sobre o mundo. É, portanto, através da atitude espiritual que a comunidade de sujeitos espirituais é constituída e constitui o mundo da vida.

Palavras-chave: Husserl, Píscue, Espírito, Intersubjetividade, Mundo da vida.

Resumen: En este artículo pretendo mostrar cómo la relación entre el sujeto psíquico (seelischen Ich) y el sujeto espiritual (geistige Ich) es fundamental para la comprensión de la intersubjetividad y del mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt). En Ideas II, Husserl explica cómo, desde el yo, se constituyen las objetividades naturales, psíquicas y espirituales. Estos tres estratos de objetividades son conocidos desde la actitud teórica y la actitud espiritual. En este proceso, el yo se hace explícito. En una actitud teórica, tenemos la constitución de la naturaleza, para la cual el cuerpo (Körper/Leib) es fundamental. Luego, la constitución de seres de naturaleza psíquica, humana o animal, incluida la autopercepción. Asumiendo la actitud espiritual, el otro es percibido (Urpräsenz), inicialmente, como un cuerpo unido a las cosas y, junto a esta percepción, hay una aprehepción (Appräsenz) de los horizontes co-dados. Hay una identidad entre el cuerpo de otra persona y el mío, es el momento de la empatía (Einfühlung). El mundo científico se constituye a partir de una actitud teórica que es una reducción del mundo circundante (Umwelt), luego llamado mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt). Este mundo de la vida es el mundo de la actitud espiritual y precede a cualquier comprensión o explicación del mundo. Es, por tanto, a través de la actitud espiritual que la comunidad de sujetos espirituales se constituye y constituye el mundo de la vida.

Palabras-llave: Husserl, Píscue, Espírito, Intersubjetividad, Mundo de la vida.

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Introduction

In this paper I intend to show how the relationship between the psychic ego (*seelischen* Ego) and the spiritual ego (*geistige Ich*) is crucial for the comprehension of intersubjectivity and the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*). I start by defining the metaphysical premises of the argument and present a brief description of the process of constitution of objectivities in consciousness. Next, I expose the relationship between the psychic and spiritual dimensions of the ego as presented in *Ideas II* (HUA IV). *Ideas II* is divided into the constitution of the material, psychical and spiritual natures, accompanied by their corresponding change in attitude from theoretical (or natural) to spiritual (or personalistic). Only then do I approach intersubjectivity and the lifeworld. I conclude by addressing the linearity of Husserl's thought from *Logical Investigations*, a text in which his metaphysical premises are fixed, to *Ideas II*, a text in which he applies the phenomenological method to the constitution of the three strata of objectivities.

1. Consistent Metaphysical Premises in *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas I* and *Ideas II*

The metaphysical premises assumed by Husserl in *Logical Investigations* remain consistently intact throughout *Ideas I* and *II*. One of the reasons for this is that these are contemporary texts. The *Prolegomena* (HUA XVIII) was published in 1900, and *Logical Investigations* (HUA XVIII and XIX) was published in the following year. In 1913, Husserl published a re-edition of *Logical Investigations*. The *Prolegomena* underwent several changes, most of them unimportant. During the same year, he published *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and for a Phenomenological Philosophy*, called *Ideas I* (HUA III). One year earlier, in 1912, Husserl had finished his first manuscript of *Ideas II* (HUA IV), but it was only published posthumously, in 1952. In 1916, Edith Stein completed the first draft of the manuscript.

Therefore, knowing that the review of *Logical Investigations*, the publication of *Ideas I* and the first manuscript of *Ideas II* were written during the same period, it is quite plausible to argue that Husserl's thought is consistent throughout his work. Moreover, in 1936 Husserl, in a letter to Cairns (HUA XVIII, p. XLI), wrote that *Logical Investigations* is "still indispensable today".

Several thinkers had access to the manuscripts of *Ideas II*: Martin Heidegger, before the publication of *Sein und Zeit* in 1926, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who studied at the Husserl Archives of Louvain, Paul Rickert and Alfred Schütz.¹

Another reason for why I maintain Husserl's thought consistency is that his metaphysical premises – intentional and transcendental consciousness, and ontological realism – remain intact throughout these texts.

The first premise of subjective order is evident in *Logical Investigations* when Husserl analyses the three concepts of consciousness (HUA XIX/1, 378 et se.) and extracts a phenomenological definition of it. Consciousness is intentional (HUA XIX/1, 366) because it is consciousness of the world, always intentionally united to the world and consciousness of the world as experienced. Consciousness is also transcendental because it is the agent and the place where the unveiling of the world takes place; it is the site of intuition of essences and the constitution of objects. It is the real and constant unity of the experiences of the ego.

In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl demonstrates that phenomenological reduction evidences the unity of the "stream of consciousness" (HUA XIX/1, 369), that is, that the phenomenological ego is ontologically prior to the empirical ego, or even the phenomenological ego intentionally constitutes the empirical ego. "Being-in-consciousness means being-objective for an ego: such being-objective cannot in its turn be made into an object" (HUA XIX/1, 373).

I can only clarify this situation by subjecting the empirical ego, with its empirical relation to objects, to phenomenological analysis, from which the above conception necessarily results. We excluded the body-ego, whose appearances resemble those of any other physical thing, and dealt with the mind-ego [*geistige Ich*], which is empirically bound up with the former, and appears as belonging to it. Reduced to data that are phenomenologically actual, this yields us the complex of reflectively graspable experiences described above, a complex which stands in the same sort of relation to the mental ego [*seelischen Ich*] as the side of a perceived external thing open to perception stands to the whole thing. Reduced to data that are phenomenologically actual, this yields us the complex of reflectively graspable experiences described above, a complex which stands in the same sort of relation to the mental ego as the side of a

¹ Information taken from the Prefaces of *Ideas II*, editions in Spanish (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005) and English (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, first print, 1989).



perceived external thing open to perception stands to the whole thing. (HUA XIX/1, 374)²

The concepts of the (i) empirical or body ego, (ii) psychic, soulful or mental ego and (iii) spiritual ego, understood as the highest degree of transcendental consciousness, are strongly evident in *Ideas II*, as explored in the following paragraph.

In *Ideas I*, Husserl states, “on the one hand consciousness is said to be the absolute in which everything transcendent and, therefore, ultimately the whole psychophysical world, becomes constituted; and on the other hand, consciousness is said to be a subordinate real event within that world.” (HUA III, 103). He steadily continues, “The Ego, however, is something identical. [...] In contradistinction, the pure Ego would, however, seem to be something essentially necessary; and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in mental processes, it cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or moment of the mental processes themselves.” (HUA III, 109)

Furthermore, in *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl maintains his comprehension of consciousness. It is intentional – “In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such” (HUA I, 71) – and it is transcendental – “All my distinguishing between genuine and deceptive experience and between being and illusion in experience goes on within the sphere itself of my consciousness [...] Every grounding, every showing of truth and being, goes on wholly within myself; and its result is a characteristic in the cogitatum of my cogito” (HUA I, 115).

This is to say that consciousness is the place where knowledge, unveiling and constitution of the world occurs.

The ego is this intentional and transcendental awareness turned to the world and, simultaneously, the constant that maintains unity in the face of all experiences and changes – the place of intuition of essences and constitution of objectivities. The investigation of phenomenology involves identifying the structural essentials of this intentional relationship, which encompasses both consciousness and the world as experienced.

The second premise of objective order is ontological realism (NIINILUOTO, 2004, p. 1), specifically, the assumption that the world is a mind-independent objectivity. I now quote several passages that support this comprehension. In the following passage of the *Prolegomena*, Husserl addresses the unity of science based on both the unity of explanation and the unity of the thing:

There are, in the second place, external standpoints which range truths into one science: the nearest to hand is the unity of the thing in a more literal sense. <237> One connects all the truths whose content relates to one and the same individual object, or to one and the same empirical genus. This is the case in regard to the concrete, or, to use von Kries’s term, the ontological sciences, such as geography, history, astronomy, natural history, anatomy etc. (HUA XVIII, 237)

Moreover, in *Ideas I* there are several passages (HUA III, 11, 17, 49, 70, 74, 84, 86–87, 98–103) where Husserl treats the natural world as correlative to consciousness. I offer one example:

This is true of any conceivable kind of transcendence which could be treated as either an actuality or a possibility. *An object existing in itself is never one with which consciousness or the Ego pertaining to consciousness has nothing to do.* The physical thing is thing belonging to the surrounding world even if it be an unseen physical thing, even if it be a really possible, unexperienced but experienceable, or perhaps experienceable, physical thing. (HUA III, 88–89)

In *Cartesian Meditations* (HUA I), published in 1931 after the *Conferences of Paris* (1929), Husserl acknowledges that the evidence of the world is not apodictic (HUA I, 57/58). However, this does not imply denial of the existence of the world as mind independent but simply taking a philosophical critical attitude – *epoché* (HUA I, 60). Thus, he assumes the same premise: “Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts” (HUA I, 65). Ahead of this, he asserts:

In any case then, within myself, within the limits of my transcendently reduced pure conscious life, I experience the world (including others) and, according to its experiential sense, not as (so to speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than mine alone [*mir fremde*], as an intersubjective world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to everyone. (HUA I, 123)

Therefore, these unexperienced realities can manifest as given data, as part of an indeterminate but determinable co-given horizon, and their fulfilling is defined by their a priori eidetic type.

Considering these premises, Husserl’s line of thought is highly consistent not only due to the maintenance of metaphysical premises but also due to the emphasis placed across his works that reveals the steps of

² In this paragraph, J.N. Finley translated “*geistige Ich*” as mind-ego and “*seelischen Ich*” as mental ego. In the Portuguese and Spanish editions, “*geistige Ich*” is translated as spiritual ego (*eu espiritual / yo espiritual*), and “*seelischen Ich*” is translated as soulful ego (*eu animico*) or psychic ego (*yo psiquico*). I consider the translations of the Portuguese and Spanish editions more faithful to the Husserlian proposal. Therefore, I quote according to J.N. Finley translation, but I consider “*seelischen Ich*” as psychic ego and “*geistige Ich*” as spiritual ego.



phenomenology. In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl proposes the phenomenological agenda, presents the conditions of knowledge with an emphasis on language and emphasizes the acts of conscience – the noetic dimension. In *Ideas I*, he presents the phenomenological method as a path to reveal essences, the transcendental structure that allows the constitution of objectivities and the necessary noetic-noematic relationship. In *Ideas II*, the emphasis is on objectivities and the world, and it moves to the other extreme, to the contents of the acts of conscience, to the noematic dimension.

2. The Constitution of Objectivities in the Conscience in *Ideas I*

In *Ideas I*, Husserl recognizes that the constitution of objectivities in transcendental consciousness is a challenge for phenomenology, what he refers to as *Die funktionellen Probleme* (HUA III, 176). When considering transcendental consciousness as the place of constitution of the transcendent world (HUA I, 115–116) full of mind-independent objectivities (HUA III, 11, 17, 49, 70, 74, 84, 86–87, 98–103; HUA I, 57, 65, 95, 123), how is their constitution in consciousness possible?

Primarily, it is necessary to understand that, for Husserl, to constitute is to unveil. Constituting cannot be confused with the Kantian attitude of legislating over the object. The Husserlian subject is under *epoché*, with its judgment suspended and knowledge and categories in parentheses. Therefore, it does not impose anything on the given experience. The subject simply intuits its essence, and still under the state of *epoché*, undertakes its unveiling. In “*Konstitution der Bewußtseinsgegenständlichkeiten*” (HUA III, 176), Husserl writes:

It is therefore a matter of inquiring, in the most comprehensive universality, into Objective unities of any region and category are “constituted in the manner peculiar of any consciousness” [...] All of the basic kinds of possible consciousness and the variations, fusions, synthesis of essential necessity belonging to them are a matter to be studied and made evident in eidetic universality and phenomenological purity (HUA III, 177).

Constituting can also be understood as donating sense (*Sinn*), and donate sense (understood as noematic or objective sense) cannot be confused with creating objectivities. Consistent with the previous definition of constitution, donating sense is not arbitrary but dependent and limited by the essence of objectivities.

For example, each actual physical thing belonging to Nature is thus represented by all the senses and changing fulfilled posita in which it is the correlate of possible intensive mental processes as determined and further determinable thus and so; <it is> therefore represented by multiplicities of “full cores” or, which signifies the same thing here, by all ‘subjective modes of appearances’ in which it can be noematically constituted as identical. (HUA III, 279)

The senses are donated in a guided way, limited by ontological regions and essences (HUA III, 279), or in terms of the *Prolegomena*, enclosed in a nomological unity and in the unity of the thing (HUA XVIII, 236). Zahavi (2001, p. 8) states the following:

It must therefore be stressed once again that the explication of the constitutive subjectivity proceeds in inseparable connection with a phenomenological exploration of the world that stands before it. This interdependence is explicitly emphasized by Husserl in this so-called *ontological* way to reduction, where he describes the way in which constitutive phenomenological research advances in constantly two-sided (and thereby mutually determining) steps. The elucidation of a particular ontological regions, which is then designated as a *transcendental leading clue*, systematically leads back to the consciousness phenomenologically constituting it, so that the objectivities in question are made understandable, in their sense and being, as the essentially prescribed products of the correlative structure of cognitive life. (17/270[263]; cf. 6/175[172]).

The two forms of constitution, unveiling and giving sense, are not arbitrary voluntarist procedures or the result of imagination or will. Both are inexorably driven and limited by ontological essences and regions. In the subjective dimension, the acts of consciousness are limited by the noetic-noematic nexus that determines which acts are appropriate for each experience and capable of capturing and thinking about each object. In the objective dimension, the data initially apprehended inappropriately is determined by its essence, and, for greater clarity, the eidetic variation operates according to its modes prescribed a priori (HUA III, 310–312). This is to say that its ontological region circumscribes a closed group of investigation submitted to noematic determinations and relations, and its essence limits the possible variations.

This is the individual constitution in empirical consciousness. In *Ideas II*, Husserl presents the next level, the constitution of the intersubjectively identical thing.



3. From an Individual Constitution to an Intersubjective Constitution in *Ideas II*

In *Ideas II*, the essence-description procedure proposed in *Ideas I* is applied initially to nature in general and then to things. The assumptions assumed and mentioned above are also present in *Ideas II* – intentional and transcendental consciousness, and ontological realism (HUA IV, 58 and 77). This last premise appears heavily, underlying the role argument. Alongside ontological realism, it is possible to identify one more premise – the regularity of nature (HUA IV, 58), which unfolds in the principle of causality. Both premise and principle are necessary for knowledge and science.

3.1. The body

The body is an instrument for constituting material objectivities, as it is through the body that the experience of nature, things and others is possible. The body mediates the subject-object relationship. Through the various bodily acts of consciousness (acts of sensory perception), intentional and transcendental consciousness is able to produce an aesthetic synthesis (HUA IV, 19–20) and unify the continuous multiplicity of sensitive intuitions.

At this moment, the body is not constituted as an object but as a condition for the constitution of material objectivities. Things are given to the subject (through the body) as a unit in a spatial-temporal-causal nexus. In other words, sensations constitute the thing's notes, for example, its colours, and simultaneously its circumstances and relationships, for example, its causality (HUA IV, 57). The body is part of this nexus; it is the referential entity to whom the world reveals itself, a system of subjective conditionality intertwined with a system of spatiotemporal causality (HUA IV, 64–65).

Husserl distinguishes, then, two dimensions of the body. *Körper* (HUA IV, 154) is the body as a thing belonging to the world, submitted to the space-time-causal nexus, the external face of the body, and *Leib* (HUA IV, 152–153) is the body as a perceptual organ connected to an intentional and transcendental consciousness, the inner face of the body. The experience of an external stimulus, for example, touch, is captured through the sensitive perception, the physical contact of the hand touching the surface, and this sensitive stimulus causes a psychic (or soulful or mental) impression. In this sense, Husserl distinguishes between *körperliche Ausdehnung*, a material expansion of the sensitive stimulus, and *Ausbreitung*, a sensory propagation of the sensitive stimulus (HUA IV, 148–149).

The body is the only reality that can be moved by the subject; it is the physical centre of reference and orientation in the world, and the world presents itself to the subject through the body. In fact, the world presents itself to the body and the body presents the world to consciousness. Therefore, the body is not just a thing but an organ of the spirit (HUA IV, 96).

3.2. Psychic subject

Even with this close link between the psyche and body, the giving of the psyche³ does not happen through the body but as a unit of the flow of experiences, as a stream of consciousness, something with a specific essence that is independent of the body. The psyche differs from the body by (i) being in permanent alteration, in essence, a flow (HUA IV, 133) and (ii) being an unfragmentable unit (HUA IV, 134). In Husserl's words, "We distinguish, ever faithful to what is given intuitively, between the pure or transcendental ego and the real psychic subject [*reale seelische Subjekt*], the psyche or soul, the identical psychic being which, connected in a real way with the respective human or animal Body, makes up the substantial-real double being: the animal, man or brute"⁴ (HUA IV, 120).

The relationship between body and psyche is therefore not a causal but a conditional relationship (HUA IV, 132), variable according to circumstances. The psyche depends on the following circumstances: (i) psychophysical, dependent on the body, (ii) idiopsychic, dependent on itself and its internal circumstances and (iii) intersubjective.

Furthermore, psyches have levels, as they differ qualitatively from species to species. The animal (*tierisch*) psyche, for example, lacks the stratum of theoretical thinking in the strict sense, characteristic of human subjects (HUA IV, 134–135).

The self is the same functioning identical subject in all acts of the same stream of consciousness. It is the radiating centre of all life of consciousness, affections and actions – the polarity of acts (HUA IV, 105). Actions, emotions, states, qualities, attributes, interests, abilities and dispositions refer to a psychic unit (HUA IV,

³ In *Ideas II*, Husserl consistently uses the term *Seele* (noun) and *seelischen* (adjective). In English, the translation of *Seele* can be *psyche*, *soul* or *mind* (noun), and the translation of *seelischen* can be *psychic*, *soulful* or *mental* (adjective). In the English edition of *Ideas II*, Rojcewicz and Schuwer translate *Seele* as *soul*, *seelischen* as *psychic* and *Geist* as *spirit*. To facilitate the association between nouns and adjectives, I am translating *Seele* as *psyche* and *seelischen* as *psychic*.

⁴ *Tier* is translated as *animal* (noun), *tierisch* as *animated* (adjective). It comprises only irrational animals, the brute. *Animal* is also translated as *animal* (noun), and *animal* as *psychic* or *soulful* (adjective). It comprises all animated beings including brute and human beings.



93). This constancy in the flow, this sameness in the midst of changes, is the reference point of experiences, the source of acts of consciousness and the centre of identity. In the formation of the ego, the psychic dimension therefore takes precedence over the corporeal one (HUA IV, 94). Abstracting the body, the question remains: from where do these acts emanate? What is the source of states, interests and skills, for example?

The psyche receives sensitive stimuli through the body and emanates perceptual, sensitive or corporeal acts of consciousness, as well as psychic and emotional acts of consciousness. Both corporeal and psychic acts are involuntary and originate from a constant source, in contrast to the flow of experiences. Consciousness is always the same, an identical subject floating in the current of living experiences and always acting (and reacting) to the stimuli. For example, I enter an environment at 45 degrees, receive the thermal stimulus, feel the heat and feel hot and discomfort, or I cross a rope bridge 100 metres high, receive the visual stimulus, perceive the height and feel scared.

Even in the face of so many experiences with their respective and diverse acts of conscience, it is possible to perceive the unity from which the acts emanate, a unity that is not confused with the flow of living experiences or with the acts through which such experiences are captured – this is self-awareness (HUA IV, 99 and 106). Put another way, the ego, at the same time that it emanates the acts of conscience, perceives, feels, thinks, judges, and so on, abstractly manages to differentiate itself and stand out from the flow of such acts. The ego perceives itself as a source of mental activity and thus can become an object for itself (HUA IV, 101).⁵

The self in thinking about itself becomes the object of a new act of consciousness. This act is an act of the same self, so the thinking self captures itself as the self thought in its previous moment. Self-awareness captures the self as a unit in duration. The self perceives itself in the experience, active, interacting, as a living life – this is the psychic subject.

3.3. From the naturalistic attitude to the personal attitude, from the psychic to the spiritual and from the individual to the intersubjective

Until this point in the argument, Husserl valued a naturalistic or theoretical attitude. In this attitude, the subject thinks in a natural-scientific way, seeks patterns, regularities and repeats, trying to list and control the variables, as well as measure. The investigator is in an attitude of knowledge but still a scientific-natural attitude, not a phenomenological one. That is why the investigator strives to drive away emotions, values with logical judgments and abstracts from other values (HUA IV, 25-26). It is an active attitude that is not limited to a set of doxic acts (HUA IV, 3-4). The target can be individual or categorical, both carried out by acts of a higher level (HUA IV, 6).

In this attitude, material objects are constituted, including objects of a psychic nature, animals and humans. Humans are given through the body immediate apprehension, eidetic intuition that captures spiritual individuality, abilities, intellectual and practical skills, character and mentality (HUA IV, 139). Besides, human subjects are apprehended in their circumstances and cosmic context, in a dependent relationship with their surroundings (HUA IV, 140). In their natural, theoretical, emotional and practical attitude, individuals are conditioned by things and by themselves, by physiopsychic and idiopsychic conditions. However, this does not imply a determination but only a necessary condition. For example, to play soccer, I must have my leg movement preserved (physiopsychic condition), and to be a good soccer player, I must have talent and discipline (idiopsychic condition), but even meeting these two conditions does not imply that I will be a football player.

I quote Husserl:

On the one hand now it is certainly clear that in the apprehension of the subject, with respect to all states of acts, the physiopsychic and idiopsychic dependency is somehow assumed, but that, on the other hand, in all specifically personal contexts in which the personality manifests its *personal* properties, they, properly speaking, play no role. What is remarkable thereby is that we say the *psychic Ego* and the *personal Ego* are, in their underlying basis, *the same*. (HUA IV, 141)

In other words, the person's reality consists in having real properties such as spiritual/ personalist properties that have rule-based relationships with the body, psyche and the surrounding world. On the other hand, physiopsychic and idiopsychic dependence is contemplated, but with regard to the various states of affairs in which the spirit (or personality) manifests its spiritual (or personalistic) properties, they (the physiopsychic and idiopsychic dependencies) do not play a determining role, only a conditioning one.

There is yet another level of circumstances and dependence: the relationship with other people, between person and community, person and social institutions, the state, customs, law, the church, and so on. (HUA IV, 141). In the example above, the physiopsychic and idiopsychic conditions are met, but even so it is necessary to fight for equal opportunities to be a soccer player (intersubjective condition).

This cosmic horizon, including things and others, is perceived as co-given. The other is initially perceived

⁵ This idea is already present in the *5th Logical Investigation* (HUA XIX/1, 361-365).



ved as a body among things and, alongside this perception, there is the perception of co-given horizons. The world given to me is the same world given to the other – it is the same shared world. There is the original perception (*Urpräsenz*), and there is the corresponding perception as co-presence (*Appräsenz*). I capture the other's body and, simultaneously, the other's circumstances; I capture the alter ego and the co-present horizon of senses (HUA IV, 162-163) that surrounds us.

What was initially captured as a thing then as an animated body is now captured as similar to me; it is an apprehension by analogy (HUA IV, 168), a moment of empathy (*Einfühlung*) (HUA IV, 167). Empathy is a consciousness act that happens when the ego experiences an encounter with other being. It begins with the recognition of the other subject as an animated organism endowed with autonomous bodily movements, expressions, gestures, speech and will. The other acts independently challenge me and frustrate my expectations. I have to explain myself, move out of my comfort zone and interact. The other is part of this surrounding world (*Umwelt*) that conditions me, and the others condition me, while spontaneously governing their movements and actions. The other is a life of consciousness. It is through the consciousness act of empathy that I perceive the interpersonal world (HUA IV, 198). I understand my body and your body, here and there, in a co-presence of shared horizons. It is a community of spiritual subjects.

At this point, the right attitude makes all the difference. In a naturalistic or theoretical attitude, the psyche is nothing but an epiphenomenon (HUA IV, 175), and the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) is understood as the world of nature, the world of natural sciences and the world of causality. In a spiritual attitude, the self and the others are apprehended as units of intentional and transcendental consciousness (higher monads) that share co-given horizons and the surrounding world, are capable of intuiting and unveiling essences, that donate sense to objectivities and that are capable of acts of judgment, valuation, communication, claim, contestation, adoration and communion. In other words, to understand this community of spiritual subjects, a theoretical or naturalistic attitude is no longer enough; it is necessary to assume a new attitude, a spiritual, personalist or practical-evaluative attitude (HUA IV, 183).

4. Lifeworld

The concept of the lifeworld has varying emphasis given throughout Husserl's works, but this does not entail that it is inconsistent. As quoted at the beginning of this article, the first manuscript of *Ideas II* dates back to 1912, and in this work Husserl does not use the term lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) but describes a conceptual predecessor, mentioned in relation to the topic above, the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) – a common world of co-given horizons.

In the same sense, in the 1920 texts, more specifically in *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (1925), Husserl takes the lifeworld as the world of experience (*Erfahrungswelt*), a common surrounding world populated by objects, animated and unanimated. Objects are experienced as mentally relevant things, endowed with sense in a material-mental eidetic relationship, that is, there is a correspondence between the structure of matter sensorially experienced and the psychic structure. "Therefore, there is an analogy between the way these objects are experienced and the way in which, in experiencing a fellow-man, we experience a unity of body and psyche" (HUA IX, 111).

Following the same idea, in his later texts, especially *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendente Phänomenologie* (1935), Husserl developed the concept of the lifeworld. The lifeworld is the only effective world (HUA VI, 49), universal-common (HUA VI, 128). The lifeworld is given to perception as the only experienced and experienceable world (HUA VI, 49), the domain of original evidence (HUA VI, 130) and the everyday, prescientific surrounding world of life (HUA VI, 50).

Husserl recognizes that there is some difficulty in explaining the objectivity of the lifeworld considering that the first *epoché* suspends judgment about all objective sciences. However, he states:

But this embarrassment disappears as soon as we consider that the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a *general structure*. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative. We can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a way equally accessible to all. As life-world the world has, even prior to science, the "same" structures that the objective sciences presuppose in their substruction of a world which exists "in itself and is determined through "truths in themselves" (this substruction being taken for granted due to the tradition of centuries); these are the same structures that they presuppose as a priori structures and systematically unfold in a priori sciences, sciences of the *logos*, the universal methodical norms by which any knowledge of the world existing "in itself, objectively" must be bound. (HUA VI, 142)

It is owing to this that Husserl states that an entirely autonomous logic as a universal a priori science fundamental to all objective sciences is naive (HUA VI, 144). This is not because it is an arbitrary and historical human construction but because it does not ask about its own fundamentals. For that, it is necessary to go back to the pre-logical universal a priori from which everything logical is possible (HUA VI, 144), an a priori



science of the lifeworld – phenomenology.

What is relevant here is that, although Husserl makes this a priori structure of the lifeworld a validity condition of all subsequent knowledge (HUA VI, 143), he recognizes that this apriorism of the lifeworld is given to the subject, and only in this sense is it relative to the subject. This does not imply a world created by subjectivity or mind-dependent or historically derivative processes. The sciences are part of this lifeworld and as such must also undergo the *epoché*, but there is still a common world, co-given horizons, in which essences and the relationships between essences are manifested. It is not an arbitrary world. It is a world where intersubjectively is unveiled, and it is the philosopher's role to uncover it (Brainard, 2007).

Nenon (2013) explains how the ego's spiritual activity is important for the transition from the individual to the intersubjective:

The ego is not merely passive [...] We are not just active in the sense of "reacting" passively and do not necessarily always simply follow those immediate urges, but can also respond to them actively in a further sense, not just in actions in the sense of interactions with things in the world, but also in our own responses to these immediate impulses. [...]

It is also important to emphasize that even at the most elementary levels of so-called "pure passivity", Husserl characterizes these affections in motivational terms instead of in terms of natural causality. [...]

They are processes that are part of the *geistige* life [...]

The opposite of the "*Geistige*" for Husserl is not the "bodily" (*Leibliche*) but rather the merely "natural" in the sense of the modern natural sciences that recognize only "objective" [...] The *geistige* world is not the natural world of theoretically determinate realities, but rather the practical world in which our understanding of value-predicates and ends is constitutive for our experience of the realities (and idealities) that we experience there. (Nenon, 2013, p. 153–155)

It is in this world, given to and shared by spiritual beings, that through communicative (HUA IV, 171) and social (HUA IV, 184) acts it is possible to experience traditions, religion, politics, culture, sports, art, and so on. The world is the everyday world, the lived world (*Lebenswelt*), a world governed by the motivation that constitutes sociability, a community of senses donated in a shared way through communicative and social acts but limited by the essences present in the common surrounding world (HUA IV, 191).

I quote Husserl:

As a person, I am what I am (and each other person is what he is) as *subject of a surrounding world*. The concepts of Ego and surrounding world are related to one another inseparably. Thereby to each person belongs his surrounding world, while at the same time a plurality of persons in communications with one another has a common surrounding world. (HUA IV, 185).

Therefore, one should not interpret the lifeworld as a "*subjective-relative historical world*" (Tani, 1986, p. 61). Nothing resembles social constructionism. In the previous example, the soccer player – I think in Marta Vieira da Silva – first met the physical-psychic and idiopsychic conditions, and then the intersubjective condition – the recognition of her talent was met. This recognition is not an arbitrary and unfounded social construction. It is based on psychophysical conditions, Marta's body is fully functional; in idiopsychic conditions, Marta made a decision, kept it out of conviction and made a great effort with determination and persistence, and only then was there an opportunity to satisfy the intersubjective conditions, the job offers and sponsorship and the recognition of her talent, until she was chosen six times as the best soccer player in the world. Each of these relationships is enhanced and limited by an a priori eidetic structure.

Therefore, the concept of the lifeworld is consistent throughout Husserl's works: first, it is the objective world understood as mind independent, a priori, universal and ordered according to an eidetic structure; second, it is the surrounding world, common, shared, with co-given horizons, in which all subjects live and what all subjects experience; third, it is the condition of possibility and validity of all knowledge; and fourth, it is where subjects live their lives, establish their relationships and build their history, all before producing any objective knowledge.

Conclusion

Husserl departs from but remains linked to the subject, who is in constant relation to reality. At no time does he abandon or even quibble about his early premises: intentional and transcendental consciousness, and ontological realism. Consciousness is a subjective constant to which the real world reveals itself. The world is mind independent and a priori. It is in this co-shared world where spiritual subjects, empowered and limited by essences, unveil, donate sense, judge, value, establish their habits and live their culture and history.

Therefore, Husserl follows a consistent trajectory between *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas II*, passing through *Ideas I*. Not only does he remain firmly adhered to his metaphysical, ontological and anthropological-philosophical premises, but he also develops the project of phenomenology, not only as a method but as a



possibility for understanding human beings, their interactions with others and the world. Husserl starts from a critique to psychologism, proposes consciousness as intentional and transcendental, investigates acts of consciousness and their structure, presents the phenomenological method and its potential and finally applies it, unveiling intersubjectivity and all beauty of the lifeworld as a community of spiritual subjects who intuit and describe essences and donate sense in a common way.

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